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Avi Sion
Age: 59 Gender: 
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Joined: 30 Sep 2005
Posts: 69
Location: Geneva, Switzerland
488.23 points
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 Posted: Fri Dec 02, 2005 9:50 am Post subject: subdivision or reduction |
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Plamen: I will mull over your last post a bit later, before answering you. However, in the meantime I will already post here some words I had already prepared for you.
I would like to add the following few words to my last comment to you. Returning to your initial description of the subdivision of the chariot into its parts:
| Quote: | | We can take the wheel of the chariot and see that it cannot exist independently of its spikes, etc. parts, take further the spike and see that it cannot exist independently of the wood threads, etc., take the wood thread and see that it cannot exist independently of its molecules, take the molecules and see that they cannot exist independently of their atoms, take the atom and see that it cannot exist independently of the dharmas that are the component parts of it. |
– a process that you later label a mereological “reduction”, I realize that this account of the whole-parts relation is misleading.
We do not strictly speaking have a mental process of reduction, be it subdivision or aggregation. Why? Because we do not know in advance what is divisible into what parts, or for that matter what can be aggregated into what whole. Before we can relate two items of experience (or two conceptual constructs) as whole and part respectively, we must first become aware of them as distinct items in themselves.
That is to say, before I can say: “X is composed of Y, Z, etc.”, or conversely say “X is part of Y” – I must first become aware of X and Y (and Z, etc.).
Such awareness may be perceptual or conceptual, as already stated, but logically it must precede any proposition affirming a relation between them as whole and part(s) respectively. The latter proposition is a subsequent rational judgment, concerning already formed terms. This judgment does not mentally produce one term out of the other. It merely relates already identified items together in the way of whole and part.
Returning to my (modernized) example.
I look at a car. At first sight, I see the whole.
Then, in a series of second looks, I focus in turn on its parts – the shape, the color, the design of the wheels – and similar immediately-visible items. I do not yet see them as parts, but as distinct items bounded by my visual focus.
I may now decide to define the relation of these various first-sight and second-look items to each other. I judge it to be a whole-parts relation. Why? Because the two sets of items share space and/or time. e.g. The car as a whole shares space (and time) with its wheels. The car includes more space than the wheels, the wheels have no space beyond the car. Therefore, the car is whole, the wheels are space.
In this way, in our present perceptual example, you see that the relation is established empirically, but it requires previous identification of the terms. I did not mentally “subdivide” the car into its parts; nor did I “aggregate” the parts into the car. I perceived the two sets in turn, then with reference to the space-time setup, I inferred a convertible proposition about their having a relation of whole and part.
This proposition is an inductive hypothesis – it could upon reflection turn out to be inappropriate to a given case. For instance, I may wonder whether a car as a whole necessarily includes functioning lights – or whether I still have a whole car without them.
Moreover, just by seeing the car as a whole and some visible parts, I do not have enough data to mentally subdivide it into its ultimate parts or dharmas as the description you gave earlier suggests. For example, I cannot with my naked eyed tell that the car is made of steel atoms or its seats are made of real leather, or that these materials are ultimately made of protons and electrons, etc.
In any case, these items – atoms, etc. – are scientific concepts, hypotheses about the composition of matter.
Such further “subdivisions” require much more empirical research and formulation of complex conceptual theories, in an ongoing effort of adduction. They are not immediately knowable to anyone, not even to advanced Buddhist gurus. Conclusions change over time, and every statement is a hypothesis.
Thus, it is inaccurate to describe “subdivisions” ex post facto as some sort of easily done process of the mind, through which someone might conceivably sitting in an armchair arrive at the ultimate dharmas. The whole and part relation, like any other proposition, depends on perceptions and theories – it is not known by a sort of “reduction”.
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Avi Sion, Ph.D.
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Plamen
Age: 54 Gender:
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| Posted: Fri Dec 02, 2005 9:07 pm Post subject: Re: subdivision or reduction |
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| Avi Sion wrote: | | Before we can relate two items of experience (or two conceptual constructs) as whole and part respectively, we must first become aware of them as distinct items in themselves. |
Very good point.  And since there are no things in themselves (nihsvabhavatva), the whole-parts relation becomes totally unaccountable. |
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Avi Sion
Age: 59 Gender:
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Location: Geneva, Switzerland
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| Posted: Tue Dec 06, 2005 8:58 am Post subject: whole-parts |
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Plamen: in response to your last two posts.
As I have indicated from the start, I believe the problem of whole and parts must first be approached with an epistemological perspective, before venturing into any ontological speculations.
В· I have above tried to do that, taking a phenomenological stance, i.e. considering the phenomena we encounter in experience, before conceptual judgments.
В· I thus showed that the cognitive order of whole and parts is irrelevant, i.e. that either of them may precede the other, depending on which we happen to focus on first.
В· Then I argued that whichever happens to come first in a given case, one thing is sure and that is that we must first become conscious of these two items before we can relate them together as whole and part.
В· This means to say that the whole-parts relation is not essentially an empirical one (though it may be based on empirical indices, such as spatial and/or temporal inclusion), but clearly a conceptual category.
· I also stated that the model apparently proposed by some Buddhist philosophers of a mental process of aggregation (of parts into whole) or of subdivision (of whole in parts), which you labeled “reduction” – this model, in view of the above considerations, is inappropriate.
В· We should not confuse the mental act of focusing on all or part of a perceptual field (which involves a personal projection of outlines) with such reduction. Focusing indeed occurs during data gathering, whereas reduction is only possible ex post facto in the way of an ordering of already memorized data.
So much for the epistemological aspect, here.
Turning out to the ontology of the whole-parts relation, the issues are more complicated.
For example, returning to the chariot (or rather to my more modern version, the car), although say a wheel is considered “part of” the vehicle, a passenger is not so considered, even though like the wheel he fits within the space of the car as a whole for a while. It follows that the parts-whole relation cannot be simply defined with reference to “sharing of space for some time”.
I agree with the Buddhists that there is in this relation a difficulty of precision, which makes it rather conventional. Or as you put it, “unaccountable”. This is evident if we take the example you gave of a house.
· Viewed statically, at one time, the house and its bricks seem to be in a straightforward whole-parts relation. However, this relation becomes complicated if we consider various contingencies…
· If we remove some of the bricks, is it still the same house? How many bricks have to be removed till it ceases to be “the same” house? Is it just a matter of its being still recognizable? What if we cut off a wing of “the” house, or parts of it erode?
В· What if we change all the bricks one at a time (overlap), or all at once (no continuity), but retain the same shape and size? What if we renovate the house to the extent that it is unrecognizable? What if we move the house as a whole into a different environment?
В· What if we take the same bricks, and build another shape and size of house with them? What if we swop the bricks of one house with those of another?
В· Moreover, do the furniture and inhabitants within the house count as part of the house? Clearly not, even if the furniture is nailed into the wall. What of the paint job? Etc., etc.
Such considerations show that the matter is not simple at all.
What makes it one house for us is perhaps a common plan (in the case of a man-made object like a house), or at least some common aspects of form. Without a physical plan, we would simply refer to human memory, though of course that too is very approximate.
I would agree with the Buddhists that the house has no “atman”, i.e. no invisible “ghost” underlying the material bricks (even when some are missing or eroded), serving as a real “essence” of the house however much we change the bricks.
I would agree that “the house” is in this limited sense a conventional entity (which does not mean that it does not exist as a whole with parts at some given moments of time). It is conventional in that its delimitations in space and time are somewhat arbitrary.
Note well however that referring to the material bricks alone is inadequate, since the same bricks can be used to form very different “houses”.
Note also, all this applies to inanimate matter. When we consider living matter, the issues are further complicated. Thus, for instance, a tree may have some of its branches cut off and survive; or even in some cases its trunk, so long as some roots are left alive. A man may have his arms and legs blown off, yet live; even, some of his organs may be removed. But what is life? Not just a specific material composition, surely, but one in which certain motions are potential and eventually actual.
Here we see that “parts” should not be considered just in material terms, but may be motions or more abstract aspects.
All of this does not necessarily imply the Buddhist theory that human beings have no “soul”. For the soul need not be construed as they do as an abstraction for the aggregation of all material parts and motions of the body-mind (by the latter I mean phenomenal mental events like memories, dreams, emotions, etc.). It may be considered as something apart from (be it in the midst of, underlying or over and above) the body-mind.
Though it has no phenomenal aspects (visibility, audibility, etc), and therefore possibly no precise location in space, it can still exist as a substance like matter but different from matter, which we may call spirit. To affirm existence of soul, moreover, is not some arbitrary affirmation or idle speculation. There are good reasons why we need to assume such an entity – something to stand as subject of consciousness and agent of volition and valuation. Furthermore, we are manifestly in our everyday life introspectively aware of such a soul, or at least of its awarenesses and its volitions and valuations. Etc., etc.
With regard to your second post, I may add the following:
| Quote: | Avi Sion wrote: Before we can relate two items of experience (or two conceptual constructs) as whole and part respectively, we must first become aware of them as distinct items in themselves.
Plamen replied: Very good point. And since there are no things in themselves (nihsvabhavatva), the whole-parts relation becomes totally unaccountable. |
I would like to just say that I did not mean the expression “in themselves” in a Platonic or Kantian sense, as referring to some sort of disembodied non-empirical transcendent underlying essences.
I was merely referring to the particular phenomena on whose basis we form the concepts X and Y that are mentioned in statements like “X is a whole including Y as a part” – and I meant to say that these concepts must be formed first, before the said proposition can be at all formulated. That’s an obviously logical sequence of events.
Nevertheless, I agree with you (and Buddhists) that there are no “forms” in a real sense. Except, to repeat, in the case of souls (i.e. subjects/agents) – where the issues involved are very different.
But lest you think my viewpoint is a sort of spiritual materialism, I refer you to an earlier post of mine in this thread, where I said:
| Quote: | | In my view, the whole of existence, i.e. all now or ever apparent existents, including those we class as matter, mind or spirit – it is all One. This is the ultimate Reality, corresponding to the Buddhist “original ground” (and other similar ideas). Etc., etc. |
That is to say, the conundrums involved in the “whole-parts” relation in particular cases disappear if we look at the “grand whole”, i.e. in a fully holistic or monist perspective. And here, I think, all differences between Hindus, Buddhists and Westerners are ultimately reconciled and come to appear puerile.
In Buddhism, terms like “Buddha nature”, “nature of mind”, “original ground of mind”, “emptiness”, “void”, “pure consciousness” etc. – all these refer to acquiring an awareness of the common ground and origin of all experiences and thoughts.
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Avi Sion, Ph.D.
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tantidharo
Age: 54 Gender:
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| Posted: Tue Aug 14, 2007 1:55 am Post subject: re. "non-narrative textuality" |
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May I kindly interrupt to position an inquiry here?
Apropos Plamen's statement below: to what extent might it be assumed that the relationships between parts in and of themselves, i.e. disregarding wholes, are at once alogical and non-sequential, and that their order, as it were, follows the impressions of felt experience?
With thanks,
troy
Incidental reference: Thematic notes http://bauddhamata.blogspot.com/2007/08/thematic-notes.html
| Plamen wrote: | I would like to draw your attention to another quite interesting peculiarity of the Indian theory of parts and whole. It was a kind of cultural shock when, as a young student of Indian philosophy, I came to know that it was the whole that is the bearer of the parts, and that the parts consequently were not the bearer of the whole. We are accustomed to think - or maybe the people in my particular culture are - that the bricks are the substantial support of the house. The Indian logic however would take the house as the substantial bearer of the bricks in the context of their particular relations. The whole situation is connoted to as the avayava-avayvi-bhava, where avaya is the part, avayavin is the whole considered to be the subject (Atman?) of the parts, and bhava is the relation between them. To me it sounded then as a perfect match to what could be called an organic theory of the whole.
Yet another reason for the Buddhists to deny any reality to the whole, which treat comes in perfect congruence with their anatma-vada. |
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Mary
Age: 53 Gender: 
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Location: Texas, USa
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| Posted: Tue Aug 14, 2007 3:02 am Post subject: Re: re. "non-narrative textuality" |
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| tantidharo wrote: |
...to what extent might it be assumed that the relationships between parts in and of themselves, i.e. disregarding wholes, are at once alogical and non-sequential, and that their order, as it were, follows the impressions of felt experience?
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Troy,
Quite a good question. Elsewhere on this site and others, Plamen holds that the 'whole' is perceived quite ordinarily and without conceptualization and that only a very advanced yogin is able to perceive 'parts' in the same manner. Yet, an advanced yogin would be quite done with 'impressions of felt experience'.
In which case, it would seem that the only relation between the parts is that 'imparted' by the process of analysis. Of course, analysis requires conceptualization.
The very advanced yogin, it then follows, would perceive parts only in terms of their 'essence'--their svabhДЃva, as it were.
Which leaves us at the point that the 'whole', necessarily, must be only that which is composed by unrelated parts that exist in-and-of-themselves (are 'real'). While the 'whole', then, is an illusion in that it could not be svabhДЃva, consisting merely of non-related parts.
Such is analysis. Beyond conceptualization, on the 'other side' of the analytical, it would seem that the 'parts' could be only 'alogical and non-sequential'. At least, that would the 'logical' answer.
I quite look forward to any comments Plamen or Avi might have on this well-framed question.
Best regards,
Mary |
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Plamen
Age: 54 Gender:
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| Posted: Thu Aug 23, 2007 7:28 pm Post subject: |
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In view of the slaksana theory of DDD, there are only ultimate particulars out there. Logically, there is no felt experience of them, there is only the actual experience of them in the extemporal and transcendental "here and now."
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Plamen Gradinarov, Ph.D., D.Litt.
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tantidharo
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| Posted: Sat Aug 25, 2007 3:39 am Post subject: |
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Е›lakб№Јna : "smooth or continuous" like a vertical flow of oil
zlakSNa.vaadii.../ santi.dharma.upadhaah.zlakSNaa.dharma.aatman.kim.na.budhyase...
ref. http://www.cc.kyoto-su.ac.jp/~yanom/sanskrit/ramayana/nr2.e
'DDD?'
Oh, how could I have missed it.
___
Troy
Appended citation: <<...the relationship between verbal signs and the things or ideas they signify is constantly "deferred" by the resurgence of fluid and metaphorical relations between the signs themselves, the slippery "dissemination" of meaning along a chain of signifiers...>>
Seigel, Jerrold. The Private Worlds of Marcel Duchamp: Desire, Liberation, and the Self in Modern Culture. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995.
Entire text of book at http://ark.cdlib.org/ark:/13030/ft9h4nb688/ |
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Mary
Age: 53 Gender:
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Location: Texas, USa
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| Posted: Mon Aug 27, 2007 7:48 pm Post subject: |
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| tantidharo wrote: | | Е›lakб№Јna : "smooth or continuous" like a vertical flow of oil |
Does this mean that the continuous-discontinuous continuum is the root of world variegating prapaГ±ca of unrelated parts?
(Thanks for the added reference, T.)
(BTW, this is first time in several days that I've been able to login without being logged out as I move from page to page...)
Best regards,
Mary
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Kind regards,
Mary E. Lee, Ph.D. |
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