Indian Logic Forum

JohnW · Last edited by JohnW on Mon May 08, 2006 8:40 pm; edited 1 time in total

i'm working on a close reading of Chapter 6 of Chandrakirti's _Madhyamakavatara_ and would like to discuss his arguments with others in this forum. i'm trying to expand Ck's arguments into a logically valid sequence that makes sense to me (i.e. a contemporary Western mind with some training in logic and reasoning). The problem i currently have with the text is that too much of the argument is implicit for me, given my little knowledge of the context in which Ck constructed his stanzas.

For the moment i'm concentrating on stanzas 6:14-21 (production from other), and in particular on 6:14:

1 If something can arise from something other than itself,
2 You could have deep darkness arising from a flame.
3 Anything could arise from anything else,
4 Since anything that is not the creating agent would likewise be other.

Also: Would anyone happen to know where i might find an English translation of Ck's auto-commentary to his stanzas?

Many thanks, and best regards,
john

Plamen · Posted: Wed Jan 18, 2006 8:27 pm Post subject:

Better purchase the commentary of Ju Mipham Wink

For those who would like to have a glimpse of what is the paratotpada about, here is the scan of 14-21

JohnW · Posted: Tue Jan 24, 2006 2:48 am Post subject: My questions on 14.1-2

Hi, Plamen.

Many thanks for the suggestion, and for posting the text. I have been working with Ju Mipham's commentary (which i'll refer to as MA/JM), along with two or three others. None of them address the issues i have (as far as i can tell). To illustrate what my difficulty is, i'll start with the first two lines of stanza 14 (the beginning of the refutation of production by other; cf. stanza 8, lines 1 and 2, which states the tetralemma, of which 14 begins the second branch).

Chandrakirti states in 14.1-2 that if "one entity arises in dependence on another, then pitch darkness can arise from a flame." On the face of it, this reasoning seems to me to be based on the assumption that "production by another" means "production in virtue of being other," or "production by otherness itself as the cause." And Huntington (whose translation you posted, from _The Emptiness of Emptiness_, 1989) indicates in his notes that this is indeed what Ck says he means (in his auto-commentary): "That is, because of [its] quality of being other" [MAB 89 (B indicating Ck's Bhasya); quoted in Huntington 1989: 228d]. Now, to me, the thesis being examined is the proposition that the effects of a cause are "other than" the cause. That is to say: things do not produce themselves; they produce other things. Expressed as an implication, this could be stated: "If A causes B, then A is not B (that is: A is other than B). Ck seems to be stating this thesis the other way around (affirming the consequent): "being other than something implies causing that thing (or: being the cause of it)."

Now, if this is taken as a simple formulation of the thesis, it seems mistaken to me: "production by other" does not mean "production by otherness"; so i prefer to suppose that Ck is expressing some kind of conclusion at the very outset, and leaving all his premises implicit. Mipham supplies a reason that could be summarized as: "any entity A that is inherently other than any given entity B is in all relative aspects equivalent to anything else that is inherently other than B." ("Relative aspects" refers only to the qualities that depend on the relationship between the subject and B. E.g. "heavier than B," "being the cause of B," "to the left of B," and so forth.) This is the most common explanation i have found among the commentators. With such a thesis concerning otherness, it is easy to construct the implicit argument, which could be stated as follows:

Premise 1: If A causes B, A is inherently other than B (thesis of [inherent] other-production).

Premise 2: Now, every C that is inherently other than B is in all relational respects equivalent to A, since any entity (in this case, C) that is inherently other than any given entity (in this case, B) is in all relational respects equivalent to anything else (in this case, A) that is inherently other than that entity (Mipham's added premise).

Conclusion: Therefore every C that is inherently other than B is a cause of B, since A is a cause of B and all such C's are in every relational respect equivalent to A.

I have at least four problems with this reasoning as i have stated it.

First, Premise 2 seems mistaken to me, as it stands. It's the kind of conclusion one can draw by playing on words; i can see no logical validity in it.

Second, there seems to be a particular weight given to the quality (?) of inherent (essential?) otherness, quite distinct from what might be meant by the ordinary (conventional?) quality of being other. For that reason, the supposedly explicit formulation of the implicit argument given above remains implicit, since it does not refer explicitly to any specific feature of inherent otherness that would support the second (and obviously crucial) premise. In the absence of such explicit features, this premise seems mistaken to me, since clearly there is no notion of "in all respects equivalent to all 'others'" contained in the ordinary notion of otherness. I have not yet been able to invent any features for "inherent" that would support it; this is an example of a case where i need some help.

Third, i have not yet been able to come up with any good reason why Ck would not have referred explicitly to the features of inherence in his verses. He doesn't even use the qualifier "inherent" (as far as i can tell from the translations i have). I understand that such a qualifier was to be understood in Ck's time, since that was precisely the issue under debate: whether or not there could be any _inherent_ qualities or essences. But i still feel there's something lacking in the reasoning as i have constructed it. For that reason, i'm convinced that my formulation of the reasoning is incorrect. Here again is an example of a case where i need assistance.

Fourth, the reasoning as it stands actually supports the opposite conclusion: that nothing inherently other than B (like A in the reasoning above) can cause B. Mipham says as much himself: "There cannot be a relationship of dependence between two items that are inherently other" (MA/JM 187). This means not only that the thesis of inherent other-production is self-contradictory, but that nothing can be legitimately deduced from it (excluding the meaningless material deduction of any and all propositions: with false premises, any conclusion produces a valid material implication). And in that case it seems misleading to pretend to conclude, as Ck does, that a flame can produce darkness. The only valid conclusion, it seems to me, would be that there can be no production of anything with an inherent nature, and this conclusion is reached without taking the impossible detour via the proposition that all things produce all other things. This detour itself is illegitimate, and i have not yet found a way to accept the legitimacy of a conclusion reached by an illegitimate detour. I'm still looking for a way to understand this differently.

An additional puzzle for me is the fact that so far i have been unable to find any commentator who refers to these difficulties as i'm raising them. It's as if no one else sees any difficulty that might need explaining. Here's one more thing i would need help explaining!

Thanks in advance for any forthcoming help.
john

Plamen · Posted: Tue Jan 24, 2006 10:35 am Post subject:

Hi, John!

Just a preliminary remark on this transposition:

"If A causes B, then A is not B (that is: A is other than B). Ck seems to be stating this thesis the other way around (affirming the consequent): "being other than something implies causing that thing (or: being the cause of it)."

While the former is true, its reversed version is not true. That's why it is important to back up the latter statement with Candrakirti's own words. What is true on the asatkaryavada line of reasoning is only this: Being the cause of something implies its (of the cause) being different (from the effect).

But even the satkaryavada is not totally ruling out the possibility of the cause to be different from the effect, notwithstanding its containing it.

Second, it is also important to define the actual meaning of the otherness bearing in mind that Nagarjuna used two catehories for it - parabhava and anyathabhava.

Plamen

Plamen · Posted: Wed Jan 25, 2006 11:10 am Post subject:

Recently, a Russian translation of Madhyamakavatara-bhasya has been published in St. Petersburg. It is very difficult to read it in Russian if one does not know the Sankrit terms behind it and the concepts referred to, so I am curious to what extent does my English (Sanskrit-reconstructive) translation of the introduction to paratotpada section correspond to the French translation of the same portion.

(6:13 - intro, bhasya) Refutation of paratotpada

If the assertion "things do not rise from themselves" is true, as this has been proved here, still the assertion of paratotpada is not proved. What about it?

So, there are four conditions (pratyaya) that could be considered as other (para) in relation to the effect (phala), and these are: (1) the cause (hetu), (2) the supporting object (alambana), (3) the continuity (samanantara), and (4) the governing [condition] (adhipati). These conditions generate the thing (make it arise). Scripture says, things arise out of something else, no matter how would you like it.

Some say: "The hetu-pratyayas are five [out of six], the efficient cause exluded. Alambana (support) is called so because it is something to lean on. All dharmas are alambana-pratyayas of the six vijnanas, according to the circumstances. The caitta elements and the citta of the one who has attained the niratisesa-nirvana are the samanantara-pratyaya. The efficient cause is the adhipati-pratyaya."

Other say, "The cause is what brings about the existence (bhava). Basing on this mark, what is like the seed bringing about the existence of something is its hetu-pratyaya. Alambana is like the stick of the old man helping him to stand up, that's why, leaning on its support-objects, the effect (the existing dharma) gets generated. Immediate succession (continuity), without which the rise of the fruit after the cessation of the causal action would be impossible, is the samanantara-pratyaya of the fruit generation. For instance, the immediate succession of the sprout following the destruction of the seed, is a samanantara-pratyaya for the rise of the fruit. Adhipati-pratyaya is the necessary efficient condition for the rise of something. The other conditions, like the co-arising, after-arising, etc., are not separate pratyayas. That's why it is said, "there is no fifth [pratyaya]."

So they say. But these claims cannot be accepted as they contradict both logic and scripture.

JohnW · Last edited by JohnW on Wed Feb 01, 2006 6:36 pm; edited 1 time in total

Hi Plamen!

Many thanks for all the supporting information you posted. It certainly shows me how much i have yet to learn!

I have found some other texts that are helping me direct my thinking in a new way. In particular, i have obtained two other commentaries that repeat the same argument that Ck gives in 6:14. One of them (Jam-yang-shay-ba's _Explanation of Tenets_ as translated by Jeffrey Hopkins in _Meditation on Emptiness_, particularly pp. 643e-646a) gives enough detail for me to imagine that something else is going on here than what i would call deduction. Could 6:14 be simply an argument by analogy that draws conclusions no more unreasonable than those presented by the opponent?

That is, it's as if Ck were saying: "if the opponent wants to say that two self-defined and independent entities can be related in such a way that one of them (called the effect) was actually produced by the other (the cause), then there's no reason why I couldn't say that the flame of a candle produces darkness, since a causal relation between two opposing entities like light and darkness is no more improbable than a causal relation between two self-defined and independent entities." In this case, Ck is relying on the fact that the opponent's thesis (as expressed by Ck) is clearly impossible (since two independent entities cannot support a relationship of dependence, like causality), and if we are going to admit one impossibility, why not admit any and all others?

This, of course, is not what i would think of as a valid deduction, but it is (in its own way) as kind of "consequence" of the opponent's thesis, in the sense that Ck (according to the explanation i'm giving here) is simply applying the principle of the opponent's thesis in a thoroughly consistent manner: if one totally independent entity can produce another totally independent entity (such that the second, in spite of being totally independent, and self-determined, would not even exist without the agency of the first), then indeed why not admit that any independent entity could produce any other independent entity? If i'm going to accept one instance of impossible production, consistency would seem to require that i admit all of them.

Or so it might seem, at least in the framework of debate. If these instances of impossible causality were articulate beings with their own self-interest, i could imagine that if i refused to recognize flame-causes-darkness as a legitimate example of causation, the slighted flame-causes-darkness would come to me and complain, saying: "You accepted the impossible causation of independently existing and totally self-determined rice sprouts by independently existing and totally self-determined rice seeds, so why are you refusing to accept ME? In what way is my causation less possible than theirs? Don't try to tell me that I'm somehow less plausible because my two terms are contradictory: an independent sprout is equally contradicted by the independent seed that supposedly caused it."

Is this what's going on in 6:14? What the argument loses in logical force, it gains in sober plausibility (at least in my book). And after all, consistency pushed to ridiculous extremes would no doubt be one of the primary tools of someone seeking inconsistencies in philosophical positions.

Hopkins gives the title "Refuting Inherently Existent Production" to this section of Jam-yang-sha-ba's text. I think part of my problem understanding Ck is that i have no sense whatsoever of what that kind of production might be. That's probably what Ck is saying: there is no such thing, never has been, and never will be.

Plamen · Posted: Wed Feb 01, 2006 10:30 am Post subject:

Hi John,

Don't you think this argument is presenting a clear case of hetvabhasa?

JohnW · Posted: Wed Feb 01, 2006 7:43 pm Post subject: Foolish consistency

Hi Plamen!

Thanks for your comment: it reassures me that i'm not entirely lost, here (because Ck's argument, at face value, appears astonishing to me, too. i'm assuming that you do indeed hold the idea that 6:14 presents an utter contradiction, and that you're not just saying this for the sake of the discussion). And it opens avenues of exploration that i find very promising.

First, let me correct a mistake i made in the quote you pulled from my post: i meant to say "is no *less* improbable," rather than "is no more improbable." (Or rather: i should have reversed the two terms being compared.) (And since i see that this forum allows authors to edit their posts, i'll go fix that now.)

Next, before going any further, i want to check out an assumption i'm making: i'm assuming that you do not find Ck's argument in 6:14 to be convincing. Perhaps i'm giving too much weight to your statement that this stanza contains a contradiction. If you are convinced by 6:14, i'm assuming you will eventually let me known why, and how.

To follow your response by first answering your question: Yes, i do think my argument (since i'm supposing you are referring to the argument you quote, and that one was my own) presents a clear case of logical fallacy (hetvabhasa). However, that doesn't necessarily have any direct bearing on what's going on (or not!) in Ck's text; i mean: just because i'm not able to express Ck's argument in a convincing way doesn't mean Ck doesn't in fact have convincing arguments against substantial production from other. So, here is a short list of questions that arise for me, now:

1) What do you think of the idea of trying to use the requirement of consistency (and even "foolish consistency") to derive consequences that the opponent would reject?

2) Does it seem possible to you that this (or something like it) is what Ck is doing in 6:14?

3) Couldn't Ck even be "playing dumb" in 6:14? The opponent is of course not going to accept the argument here, so it might seem unnecessary to bring it up. However, it does contribute to the closure of the overall argument (6:14-21), by dealing with the extreme position that otherness itself might somehow be an operative factor in substantive other-production. The only real reason that i can think of for omitting such a patently unacceptable argument is the fact that it could try our (the readers') patience, and cause us to discount other things in the text. However, it could be that Ck's text is of a peculiar nature; and it could be that one of his primary immediate goals is precisely to test our patience.

4) Do you think that Ck does in fact claim that flame produces darkness? Couldn't we assume that he's merely pointing out a supposed consequence in the opponent's position, rather than asserting anything at all himself (other than the unacceptability of the opponent's position, of course)? And the question then becomes: is this indeed a legitimate consequence of the opponent's position?

5) Finally: We know that other-production (paratotpada) is specific: that only certain things produce certain other things, and that the matching of cause with effect is an empirical matter, not a logical one, just as causation is an empirical matter, not a logical one. The theory of other-production, however, is a logical system of sorts, and i'm curious to know: can such a system be logically consistent if it holds that all real things have inherent nature and that one real thing actually produces another real thing distinct from itself? [And that, of course, (i think) is precisely the question Ck is answering; in the negative.]

Thanks again for your willingness to help me with this. Not many people would do as much, i'm sure!

All the best,
john

Plamen · Posted: Fri Feb 03, 2006 8:59 pm Post subject:

These are all very interesting and most relevant questions. Thank you for raising them.

Indeed, we can mark the 6:14 quote as fallacious only if it really belongs to Candrakirti and was not introduced as an if clause

"if the opponent wants to say that two self-defined and independent entities can be related in such a way..., then there's no reason why I couldn't say that the flame of a candle produces darkness..."

Candrakirti is not holding the view that the candle flame produces the darkness, but he used it as a valid argument to refute the opponent thesis. The argument is not valid because light and darkness are not held to be independent entities, to begin with. Most of the accepted definitions of darkness (tamas) define it as an absence of light, so it is clearly dependent on the presence or absence of its counterrelate (pratiyogi).

On the other hand, it is only the light that is dependent on the candle flame, while the darkness depends first of all on light, and only through light on candle flame.

Of course, the definition of tamas as the absence of light could be invalidated by this invented modern example: When you direct the flashlight to an object, the darkness enveloping it disappears, but when you direct the light directly into my eyes, I will be blinded for a while, so the flashlight can rightly be defined as andhakara (blinding) - which is but a synonym for darkness.