Indian Logic Forum

Plamen · Posted: Sat Oct 08, 2005 7:59 am Post subject: The arthatva of anumAna

padArha can be translated (roughly) either as category, as the traditional rendering reads, or as "things referred to by words" (Potter 1957, et al.).

The VaiЕ›eб№Јika definition of artha (artha refers to dravya, guб№‡a, and karma - VS VIII.2.3) makes impossible the interpretation of padДЃrtha as artha referred to by word, because the rest of the V-categories will remain outside the scope of padДЃrtha) and paves the way to the scholastic abhidheyam as applied to the highest genera of being (and nonbeing), i.e., to the category in the classical Aristotelian interpretation.

One may argue that Gautama used padДЃrtha in the artha-referred sense, as thing (artha) referred by word. This claim is invalidated (1) by the question, What is the arthatva of anumДЃna?; and (2) by Gautama himself, who defines the scope of artha as covering only the substances (dravya) and the qualities (guб№‡a):

а¤ЄаҐѓа¤Ґа¤їа¤µаҐЌа¤Їа¤ѕа¤¦а¤їа¤—аҐЃа¤Ја¤ёа¤¤а¤¦а¤°аҐЌа¤Ґ: аҐ¤аҐ¤аҐ§.аҐ§.аҐ§аҐЄаҐ¤аҐ¤

Any thoughts?

Plamen · Posted: Sat Oct 08, 2005 9:14 am Post subject:

Sorry for the atad, it was a misprint. The correct text is of course

а¤ЄаҐѓа¤Ґа¤їа¤µаҐЌа¤Їа¤ѕа¤¦а¤їа¤—аҐЃа¤Ја¤ёаҐЌа¤¤а¤¦а¤°аҐЌа¤Ґ: аҐ¤аҐ¤аҐ§.аҐ§.аҐ§аҐЄаҐ¤аҐ¤

see NS I.1.14

Sarma · Posted: Wed Oct 12, 2005 7:34 am Post subject: arthatva of anumAna

The word padДЃrtha and its translation as вЂњcategoryвЂќ in English translations have always puzzled me. To me a category is a class вЂ“ as in Pattern Recognition. This is a common Sanskrit word and is used commonly in Indian languages (For example, in my own mother tongue Telugu.)

We use it in two senses - one as a word formed by the sandhi вЂ“ pada+artha meaning word-meaning. As a single word, the meaning, we ascribe for the word is вЂњmatterвЂќ close to the dravya category. In fact it is used in translation of subject names such as вЂњProperties of MatterвЂќ in Physics.

Swami Sivananda, in his description of Vaiseshika, says thus: There is enumeration of Padarthas (substances) in the beginning. Padartha means literally the meaning of a word. But here it denotes a substance discussed in philosophy. A Padartha is an object which can be thought (Artha) and named (Pada). All things which exist, which can be perceived and named, all objects of experience, are Padarthas.

To me, it appears Gautama has used in Nyaya Sutra 1.1.14, the word artha as meaning only to the sabdas denoted by the five elements in the sense of saabda-bodha.

Plamen · Posted: Wed Oct 12, 2005 10:14 am Post subject: padarthatva = abhidheyatva

Probably Swami Sivananda has narrowed the artha of padДЃrtha to include only dravyas because of the natural reification of artha to mean first of all the objective things, rather than all thinkable and describable things (viб№Јaya).

tantidharo · Posted: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:24 pm Post subject:

Predication seems eminently suitable for padArtha. In Aristotle substances are things that can be predicated, i.e. talked about. In a sense, then, the most important sense, I would think, according to this logic things are only things if and when they are talked about, i.e. defined. I greatly prefer it over category.

Predecate is from Latin prГ¦dicatum "that which is said of the subject." As applies to philosophy, predication obviously comes from the Aristotelian Greek kategoria as pertainst to the 10 classes of things that can be named. In 1827 Kant came out with the "categorical imperative."

In contrast, catagory (1588) entered English more by way of French catГ©gorie, from L.L. categoria, from the original Gk. kategorein, i.e. not Aristotle's later kategoria. The original sense was rather that of "to accuse, assert, predicate," from kata "down to," + agoreuein "to declaim (in the assembly)," from agora "public assembly." By Aristotle's time it had weakened to "assert, name."

As an interestingly aside, the English "predicament" (c.1380) used in logic as "that which is asserted" can be traced from L. prГ¦dicatus, pp. of prГ¦dicare -- that is, the same etymology as "predicate." It is a loan-translation of Gk. kategoria. It is first attested as "unpleasant situation" in 1586.

tantidharo · Posted: Tue Jun 27, 2006 3:37 pm Post subject:

But I would qualify padArtha as and through substance / substantiate / substantiation.

tantidharo · Posted: Wed Jun 28, 2006 8:38 am Post subject:

It is also worth noting that the primary meaning of pada- is that of foot, thus step, measure, define, etc. Otherwise vis-Г -vis the principle English rendering as category, this would in turn be better handled by Sanskrit gДЃna, its exact equivalent. In the end, I should think, it is the second root -artha that makes the sense of "substance" replete.

Thus moving on from Swami Sivanandaji's celebrated

tantidharo · Posted: Wed Jun 28, 2006 1:35 pm Post subject:

...or, 'the expressed admiration of artha.'

As but a casual observer, I could make abhidheyam an 'expressed admiration of object-significance or substantive wealth.' What is more, though the dheya component well approximates 'categorize' in its primary meaning of 'hold or take' with secondary senses of 'give, distribute, place, position, arrange,' etc. - still, there is no correspondence to "category" in-itself [re. Dr. Sarma's note].

That said, I would like to ask the author or anyone else for some help in understanding the gist of Plamen's

Plamen · Posted: Wed Jun 28, 2006 6:17 pm Post subject:

Inherence, universality and non-being are not arthas according to VS VIII.2.3, but are still counted as padДЃrthas - which renders impossible the interpretation of padДЃrtha as thing referred by word. Hence the prospect is open to abhidheyatva (predication) and padДЃrtha as predicable.

tantidharo · Posted: Thu Jun 29, 2006 4:12 am Post subject:

If I understand it, the point of universals being incalculable or unpredictable as objects (artha) is predicated on Vaisheshika-Sutra's setting forth that universals are svatmasattva (self-existent), and so thereby participate neither in being, qualification nor intercourse (karman). Not merely baseless unto themselves, neither are they dharmins (substrata) of other universals, nor of any particularised quirk (vishesha). Hence, if I may, it appears as the smoke of your initial query arises from the flame that lambently sucks* dhanaГ±jaya from the smouldering pyre of a Peripatetic pigeonhole impulse as composed and comprised of "predicated attributes" (dharma), but which VS is traditionally quite unwilling to treat in the terms of concrete object (artha) or substrata (dharmin). Yet inherence and non-being have eluded me here...

*cf. Sk. dhe, nirdhe, anudhe, niravadhe, vidheya.

Ref. Christopher Bartley, The RДЃmДЃnuja school according to the Sarvadarsanasamgraha: a translation, http://pcwww.liv.ac.uk/~cj2/bartley.htm