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Plamen
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 Posted: Sun Oct 23, 2005 11:50 pm Post subject: Re: the phrase “non-apprehension of non-things” |
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| Avi wrote: | | give me some explanation as to why you think Streng added the words “of non-things”. There must be some reason for this reading. |
Actually, there is no ground for such a reading. "My non-apprehension is because of the absence of that (tat, i.e., of what has been stated before) is not at all equal to "my non-apprehension of non-things." TadabhAvAt has nothing to do with non-things. If we translate abhAva as non-thing then it would be impossible to explain the function of tat.
abhAva is only absence, non-being, negation and non-being of course is not the same as non-thing. Especially bearing in mind that the opponent is a Naiyayika. They would never consider abhAva as a non-thing, i.e. never be tempted to reificate abhAva, despite the apprehension of it.
So, the phrase “non-apprehension of non-things” wandering from one translation to another translation and from one scholarly paper to another paper is a non-thing in itself, a real Unding an sich.
It is only a thing that can serve as a pratiyogin (counterrelatum, or counterpositive) to a negation, including the perceptual negation that is the non-apprehension.
Anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) is one of the three modes of existence of hetu (probans), recognised by the school of Dignaga. When the logical mark is absent (not apprehended), this is the motivation for producing the third type of syllogism known as anvaya-vyatireki (from positive invariable concomitance and negative illustration, we reach a valid conclusion).
For instance
Wherever there is smoke, there is fire.*
There is no fire [apprehended],
Hence, there is no smoke.
see modus tollens
P в†’ Q
В¬Q
вЉў В¬P
A non-apprehension, according to Dharmakirti, implies the existence of a particular individual (svabhAva-vizeSa) defined as "a thing which, being present, is necessarily perceived when all other conditions of perceptibility are fulfilled" (NB II.15). A logician can thus say, there is a non-apprehension of a thing. But saying 'there is a non-apprehension of a non-thing' is a form of philosophical truism and logical nonsense. Nagarjuna is exempt from it. Which, I am afraid, cannot be said about the author of the translation. It is partly due to such clumsy translations that Nagarjuna is accused in all logical sins.
On the other hand, non-apprehension of the absence tacitly amounts to apprehension of the presence. And, of course, such kind of logical concomitance (whatever is non-apprehended is absent) reveals a hetvAbhAsa, if and when the said conditions of perceptibility are not fulfilled.
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* Read online p. 7 of the Classical Indian Philosophy of Mind by A. Chakrabarti, an amazing service by Google
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Last edited by Plamen on Tue Nov 01, 2005 2:54 pm; edited 1 time in total |
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Plamen
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| Posted: Mon Oct 24, 2005 8:21 am Post subject: |
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Now we can reconstruct the original syllogism of Nagarjuna used in VV 30.
Let tat be the asserting or denying the existence of the objects of perception, upalabdhi - apprehension, anupalabdhi - non-apprehension. What we get as a formally valid syllogism is
If tat then upalabdhi
tadabhAva,
hence anupalabdhi
or
tat в†’ upalabdhi
В¬tat
вЉў В¬upalabdhi
Where В¬upalabdhi is clearly anupalabdhi.
"tat в†’ upalabdhi" is evidently a case of hetvAbhAsa (argumental seemingness), because upalabdhi is not always followed by judgements about the existence or non-existence of the objects. We can simply perceive the objects without producing any judgements about their existential status.
The only valid syllogism in our case is a clear vyatireki (excluding)
If anupalabdhi then tadabhAva
There is anupalabdhi,
Hence, tadabhAva.
Wherever is non-apprehension there is absence of tat,
There is non-apprehension,
hence, the absence of tat (is established).
So the seeming argument of Nagarjuna used in VV 30 should be corrected according to the valid invariable concomitance (vyApti) and assume the following form:
tadanupAlambhAn me tadabhAvaH
i.e., Because of my non-apprehension of the objects of cognition I cannot produce any meaningful judgement about their existence or non-existence.
But such ordinary logical statements are not the style of Nagarjuna.
While true within the categoriology of Nyaya-Vaisesika, this vyApti creates a big formal-ontological and transcendental-logical predicament - should ALL anupalabdha (non-apprehended) objects be given the status of prameyatva (objects of valid cognition)? Which is of course not a topic for this Theory of Negation forum.
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Mary
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| Posted: Tue Oct 25, 2005 6:29 pm Post subject: Re: Nagarjuna’s ultimate doctrinal intentions |
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| Avi wrote: |
I hasten to add that my critical attitude towards Nagarjuna is not directed towards the Buddhist goal of Enlightenment. It is a value I share. I am antipathetic only to his philosophical means, which are an unfair assault on human experience and reason. If his means were fair, i.e. if his assault were logically sound, I would subscribe to it. But there is so much sleight-of-hand involved, so many lies and manipulation, that I am invariably scandalized! |
Dr. Sion - I have an interest in critiques of Nagarjuna and have read (if not always followed) your critiques here and in e-sangha postings crica 2003. I am only a 'reader' here but, if I may, I would like to ask a question.
Given a sympathy for the "Buddhist goal of Enlightenment", I am curious as to how you might correct Nagarjuna's formal-logical errors (resulting in "sleight-of-hand", "lies and manipulation") to acheive the same ends as did Nagarjuna?
With kind regards,
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Sun Oct 30, 2005 3:42 pm Post subject: Please be patient |
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Please bear with me: Pandeia, Paramatthaka, Mary, and of course Plamen.
My intention is to offer replies to the objections, queries put to me above, as soon as I find time, one by one.
Meanwhile, PLAMEN:
could you please give me your own translation of verse 29 - premptively so-to-speak, to avoid surprises as in the case of verse 30 !!
And/or: is the full text in English (some reliable translation) of the Vigrahavyavartani available for download or copy-paste anywhere in the net to your knowledge?
Thanks in advance.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Sun Oct 30, 2005 5:34 pm Post subject: pointing the way |
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To Mary:
Concerning Nagarjuna, my point in the posting you quote was that I have no prejudice against him. In fact, when I first heard about this philosopher, I was sincerely and humbly looking forward to learning a “logic” worthy of the grand Buddhist goal. That I found him to be a philosophical con man was a great chagrin to me, first of all. This is said to preempt any critic who might suggest that I have some hidden anti-Buddhist agenda. No, I don’t.
The issue in my criticisms of Nagarjuna is never his personal spiritual status, but the “logic” of his discourse. If he claimed this illogical discourse was meaningful at some transcendental level of consciousness that I lack, I would have nothing to say. But he apparently claims his discourse to be the defeat of ordinary logic by itself. Now, that’s something I can stand up against forcefully, because it is very clearly untrue.
Incidentally, I personally very much doubt Nagarjuna ever attained “enlightenment”. How can I tell? Merely on the basis of the logical dishonesty evident in his discourse. It seems clear to me that a saintly person, who has achieved something akin to “unio mystica”, would not behave in such a manner. I wrote in a footnote in Ruminations:
| Quote: | | “Needless to say the following comments are not an attack on Buddhism, but on the rhetoric of Nagarjuna. Buddhism is not well served by such games. I think of Nagarjuna whenever I read v. 306 of the Dhammapada: “He who says what is not… and he who says he has not done what he knows well he has done… sinned against truth”. For me, he is just a philosopher like any other; his interest in Buddhism is incidental (as is his saintly status in the eyes of many).” |
Now, to answer your question, well as I can.
One thing seems evident to me – nothing good is to be achieved by skepticism and nihilism. Such a negative, mentally destructive approach cannot be the method appropriate to reaching “enlightenment”, i.e. a serene level of consciousness that (supposedly, hopefully) takes us humans beyond the evident limitations of ordinary consciousness, based on sensory, mental and intuitive experience, and on abstraction, conceptualization, and inductive and deductive logic.
It seems more fitting and likely, to me at least, that human reason and enlightenment are in a continuum of spiritual evolution, harmonious steps in the same direction. The value of the first does not have to be denied to arrive at the second. Rather, the first can be a worthy instrument, helping us to move on to the second. Note well: I readily admit that ordinary knowledge is limited; but that does not make it altogether useless.
At some point, to be sure, a quantum leap has to be made. But this involves simply dropping rational pursuits, not denying them. We do not need to go through Nagarjuna’s doubtful anti-logical discourse – it suffices for us to be silent. This is the way of meditation. At first, one has to resolve certain issues through rational discourse. Then at some point, saying anymore is too much. One has to stop being talkative, and just watch.
However, I make no pretense of being “enlightened” and therefore cannot claim to tell people how to go about becoming “enlightened”. I have always in my writings been frank about it. I only wish all who were in the same position were as honest and modest, because many still unqualified people offer to guide us thither, when they obviously have themselves not yet managed to find their way there.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Sun Oct 30, 2005 5:36 pm Post subject: the value of silence |
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to Paramatthaka
You quote the following passage:
| Quote: | | "A person who associates himself with certain views, considering them as best and making them supreme in the world, he says, because of that, that all other views are inferior; therefore he is not free from contention (with others)…. Just by laying hold of that view he regards every other view as worthless.” |
Surely, this is a good description of Nagarjuna’s thesis, rather than of my objection to it ?! He is rejecting all other views, whereas I only reject his.
By this part of your quotation and the rest of it, you seem to say to me and all those discussing here: “just shut up”. Fine, I would agree with you – provided you are including Nagarjuna in your injunction. But is that what you are doing or are you saying: Nagarjuna being a big shot Buddhist philosopher is kosher, but the rest of you being common folk are not allowed to protest?
As a man who has studied many religions, I can tell you this is a universal approach. The higher-ups in the hierarchy are allowed to speak, but the lay people are only allowed to listen and absorb without excessive reflexion. It is politically expedient to keep them on the receiving end. Praises and apologetics are encouraged, but criticism is forbidden.
This is one aspect of it, anyway. Of course, at another level, I might agree with you entirely. Ideally, if you want to advance on the Buddhist path, you indeed must at some stage “shut up” and become indifferent to all doctrinal disputes. This is excellent advice to the sincere meditator.
However, there is a third aspect, still. If you see someone stealing from or physically aggressing another person, are you not duty bound to interfere and protect the innocent victim if you feel strong enough to do so? In my view, yes – this is morality. In the case of Nagarjuna, it is innocent people’s mental health and sanity that is at stake, and ultimately their spiritual well-being.
Therefore, even if it is in principle best to avoid idle philosophizing – once someone (like Nagarjuna) has uttered an opening salvo, everyone who sees the error and danger of his (Nagarjuna’s) ways is duty bound to interfere and cry foul. The defense of truth against false views is surely a worthy cause, even within Buddhism. The policeman who interferes with the crime is not on the same level of blame as the thief or aggressor who initiated the problem.
Else why would you, Paramatthaka, have contributed this quotation to the present discussion? Is your contribution not also “a view” within a dispute (to be consistent)?
Lastly, I want to say that philosophy is not a bad thing in itself. Surely, most people who have come to be interested in Buddhism (among us Westerners at least, who have no tradition in this respect) have come to do so in part through acquaintance with its brilliant philosophy. It follows that the monks who developed these philosophies (e.g. Yogachara, etc.) did a good deed for Buddhism. There is no intrinsic wrong in being thoughtful; it is part of the dignity of man.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Mon Oct 31, 2005 5:04 pm Post subject: misuse of symbols |
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concerning S.K Wertz again
Before responding to other contributors to this discussion, I would like to add some more comments on S.K. Wertz’s presentation. It is shock full of logical and philosophical errors, which are instructive. I will therefore take the time to analyze this essay in more detail (though still more could be said). Some might well say: ad nauseam !
Wertz inserts the symbols P and E for the antecedent and consequent of Nagarjuna’s verse 29 as follows:
| Quote: | “If I would make any proposition whatever [P], then by that I would have a logical error [E];
But I do not make a proposition; therefore I am not in error” |
Thus, P means “I make a proposition (any whatever)” and E means “I have [made] a logical error”. Logically, then, not-P should mean “I do not make any proposition” and not-E “I am not in error”. As I said earlier: for logic, proposing a proposition does not have to be an explicit act of advocacy, but may occur simply by implication or condoning.
At this stage, Wertz begins confusing P as here understood with the “proposition” discussed within P – which we might call X. That is, he reinterprets P, so that its value is now tacitly “I say X”. Using this artifice, he proposes that not-P be read as “I do not say X”. P is no longer denied in the minor premise, but merely not spoken.
He uses fancy language and references to justify (cover over) this change, like “illocutionary” and “Fregean” – but this only serves to hide the narrowing of the original meaning to a more specific signification. For willy-nilly, “merely implying X” has effectively been excluded from P.
| Quote: | | If we interpret "I do not make a proposition" not as the negation ("") of P, but as a Fregean or illocutionary "act" or "negation" … which denies the uttering rather than the utterance. |
And moreover, X no longer refers to the initial “any proposition whatever”, but is now artificially limited to “some opposing view”, so that “not saying X” is not to be taken to mean not speaking at all, i.e. not saying nothing. Thus, Wertz’s following explanation goes against the original definition of P on two counts:
| Quote: | "Not making a proposition P" would be not speaking P or silence with regard to P (where P is some opposing view) and … not meaning a global linguistic silence (where P stands for any proposition whatsoever). [from the abstract].
What is P? Any proposition? No, only a few propositions (those of his opponents) are P…
Therefore the silence here is a dogmatic silence and an illocutionary act or negation (see Matilal, 234) which averts an argument. |
Wertz claim that silence averts argument is all very well – but is Nagarjuna in fact silent? No – he is talkative indeed! This remark is a fact of observation, an obedience of the law of identity. Wertz attempts to preempt this objection by making a distinction between “a true state of affairs”, i.e. categorical proposition, and a “connection” between such propositions, i.e. a conditional proposition.
| Quote: | | Also stating a conditional like the first premise, P→E, is not making an assertion or a proposition (of a true state of affairs), but rather indicating a connection between P and E that if P then E – not that P exists given P→E, only that an association exists between P and E. |
But this distinction is quite artificial in formal logic. Categoricals and conditionals are equally propositions, assertions – even if their forms differ. They both involve abstractions and other rational acts, and are ultimately judged the same way. The formal difference is superficial: a proposition “if p, then q” is also tacitly categorical, since it means “p and not-q cannot both be true”. Moreover, when Nagarjuna says “any proposition” we should read him literally, and not read exceptions into his text. Nagarjuna is a fully articulate man. If he meant a more narrow term, he would surely say so.
Thus far, regarding the antecedent P. But Wertz also sows confusions regarding the consequent E. By giving this consequent a different letter-symbol, E, formally unrelated to the antecedent letter-symbol, P, Wertz makes Nagarjuna’s statement seem like an innocuous “if–then–” proposition.
For what in truth does E mean? It means not just “making an error”, but more specifically “making an error about P”. It means that the proposition made (whether explicitly or implicitly) is wrong. Which means that either its contradictory is right, or at least we are left in uncertainty as to which is right or wrong. Thus, E really already implies “not P”, or at least “maybe P and maybe not P” !
Wertz on the other hand suggests the following, perhaps as the missing explanation:
| Quote: | | By E, "error," Nagarjuna means propositional error and not all error, because he did recognize perceptual error or "erroneous apprehension" (verse 27; 148/96), hence he could refrain from making P (propositions) and still be in error. |
He tells us that E here was only intended to mean “propositional error”, so that negation of E does not imply negation of “perceptual error”. In that case, he goes on, when P is not uttered, there is no propositional error but there might still be perceptual error. In what way would this measure save the modus tollens argument from fallacy, I wonder? Also, does Wertz for a moment believe that Nagarjuna is admitting himself to be “perceptual error”?
Moreover, while Wertz reinterprets negation with regard to P as “non-assertion of P”:
| Quote: | | So the second premise is really not represented by P but в”њP where "в”њ" is the Fregean symbol for "asserted that." |
He goes on to use the same sort of symbolic recasting of not-E into “non-assertion of E” without telling us how we are to understand this new turn of phrase ! (This is the magic trick symbols make possible.) He just says:
| Quote: | Consequently, the argument form for verse 29 should be symbolized as
P→E; ├P; ├E
Now the argument looks very different. We do not have a formal fallacy…
[this is] closer to The Middle Way. |
What does ├E mean? What is “non-assertion of making an error”? Is it suspension of judgment about whether or not there is an error, or keeping mum about a perceived error, or admission of total confusion, what? The argument sure “looks very different” now. If Wertz sees no formal fallacy in it (illicit modus tollens) it is simply because he has rendered it uninterpretable. He does not explain why this has brought us “closer to the Middle Way”.
In any case, as I previously pointed out, none of the changes in the given text proposed by Wertz in an attempt to rehabilitate Nagarjuna’s verse 29, i.e. to make it logically consistent, achieve the desired end. Even with these revisions, and ignoring their nonsense, the argument remains a non-sequitur (at least).
There is no valid argument in formal logic such that “If P, then E; say nothing of P, therefore nothing is said of E”! In Wertz’s mind, the original major premise “if P, then E” is perhaps tacitly thought of as “if P is asserted, then E is asserted” – but even so, the conclusion “E is not asserted” would not follow from the minor premise “P is not asserted”.
Wertz’s attempt to cover up this illogic by use of fancy labels like “ampliative or inductive argument” are futile. He writes:
| Quote: | | it appears that the argument is ampliative or inductive in that the truth of the conclusion goes beyond the truth of the premises, so that it is possible that the conclusion could be false and the premises could be true, i.e., more information is contained in the conclusion than is contained in the premises. |
What is ampliative is not, deductively, an argument, but merely a conjunction: he is thus just saying that the negative parts of verse 29 are added on to the positive sentence, but do not form an apodosis with it (which is quite possible – though Nagarjuna does not seem to intend this). There is no inductive argument, here – unless we understand all the sentences in verse 29 to be merely intended as bits of evidence that confirm some other thesis (which of course they are in Nagarjuna’s mind; but objectively they are not, since they are not experiences or already generally accepted insights).
In conclusion, I urge you to notice in particular, throughout the above critique, how the use of symbols often allows us to give apparent substance (and �scientificness’) to empty statements, or to hide (from oneself as well as others) the real content of our theses, and most of all to miss opportunities for deeper insight. It is to avoid such errors that I eschew symbols as much as possible in my own discourse, and stick to ordinary language.
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Mary
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| Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2005 6:53 am Post subject: Re: pointing the way |
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Dr. Sion,
Thankyou for your kind reply. Yes, I understood your wording in the post I quoted. My point was more to the 'ends' of Nagaruna's MMK. Whether he was enlightened or not is of little concern to me in this context.
My understanding is that historical pressures of the time threatened to 'pull apart' the 'truth content' of Buddhist teachings. Two extremist interpretations had developed: 1) the 'mind only' or 'consciousness only' view of utlimate reality; and 2) the - I'll use the term 'fatalist' position of pre-destination.
Thus, the MMK was put forth to dampen both movements that lead away from the 'middle way' taught by Buddha Shakyamuni. Nagarjuna was constrained by the logical structure and rules of his time - and did 'play both ends against the middle', so to speak, under those rules and structure. These rules and structures are not the same as those in later, formal (Aristotelian) logic.
If I may rephrase my question to clarify: Are there formal logical methods that he could have used to accomplish a demonstrable end of extinguishing the two extremes?
Apologies - I hope this post is more clear.
Kind regards,
M.Lee
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Plamen
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| Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2005 10:25 am Post subject: |
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I am giving only a preliminary translation of VV 29 which, hopefully, will be amended by our learned colleagues. But first we should translate the contextual VV 4
pratiSedhapratiSedho 'py evam iti mataM bhavet tad asad eva |
evaM tava pratijnA lakSanato dUSyate na mama || 04 ||
If your point of view is that what we have is a negation of negation, this is not true,
so it is your thesis that is violating the marks [of hetu, probans, i.e., identity, causation, and non-apprehension], not mine.
To this Nagarjuna replies:
yadi kA cana pratijnA syAn me tata eSa me bhaved doSaH |
nAsti ca mama pratijnA tasmAn naivAsti me doSaH || 29 ||
Should I have put forward any thesis, then the logical defect would have been mine,
but since I didn't claim anything [in a thetical form], no defect is mine.
In the autocommentary (svopajna) Nagarjuna explains that if he had put forward any thesis, he should have taken into consideration the logical marks of hetu, and could have been possibly accused in negation of negation, which in our particular case amounts to non-apprehension of non-apprehension. But since there is no claim made as to the apprehension or non-apprehension of the probans, it is impossible to be accused in holding wrong views.
Here is the full text (both Sanskrit and English translation) of Vigrahavyavartani
http://www.orientalia.org/article491.html
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2005 12:37 pm Post subject: verse 30, "non-apprehension of non-things" |
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to Plamen, in reply to your post on this
I have carefully read your long explanation of “non-apprehension of non-things”.
Because it contains many Sanskrit terms, with which I am unfamiliar, I have found it difficult to follow. I would have preferred an English text throughout, with the original Sanskrit terms in brackets here and there. Nevertheless, I will try to respond as well as I can at this time.
First, let me say that I am willing to admit your rejection of this phrase proposed by Streng.
| Quote: | | Actually, there is no ground for such a reading. |
To show you I am not attached to it, let me just say this in passing. Wertz presented this phrase, “non-apprehension of non-things” as an explanation of “not having a thesis”. I took it for granted (by your silence about it) and went on to present it as one more piece of evidence of the irrational tendencies of Nagarjuna. I did not deduce my general criticism of Nagarjuna on the basis of just this one piece of evidence, but used the latter as one inductive index among others. Therefore, as far as I am concerned, giving up this phrase (i.e. granting it as an illegitimate translation) is no big deal and does not change my view of Nagarjuna (which is based on my Buddhist Illogic study).
So, I plead guilty to your criticism:
| Quote: | | So, the phrase “non-apprehension of non-things” wandering from one translation to another translation and from one scholarly paper to another paper is a non-thing in itself, a real Unding an sich. |
But, I am sure you agree, it does not necessarily follow that from this error of scholarship in the accusation that Nagarjuna is otherwise innocent of illogic:
| Quote: | | It is partly due to such clumsy translations that Nagarjuna is accused in all logical sins. |
Now, to substance. At the end of your analysis, you read verse 30 as follows:
| Quote: | If something was apprehended by means of perception and the other [pramANas], these objects could be accepted or rejected, but because of the absence of that, what follows is my non-apprehension. [in your first post]
Because of my non-apprehension of the objects of cognition I cannot produce any meaningful judgement about their existence or non-existence. [in your second post] |
First, I’d like to raise the question of terminology. To my mind, the terms apprehension and cognition are general expressions for all sorts of consciousness: sense perception, inner perception of mental images and sounds, intuition of one’s own awareness, volitions and evaluations, and eventually even transcendental consciousness (enlightenment). I also count as apprehension or cognition all conceptual and logical insight (i.e. all abstraction) ABOUT the forgoing experiences.
Does Nagarjuna have the same nomenclature? When he speaks about non-apprehension does he mean only non-experience, or does he mean the term generally enough to include conceptual derivatives of experience? Your phrase “my non-apprehension of the objects of cognition” leaves this issue unclear.
(a) Does Nagarjuna here mean specifically the objects of experiential cognition, to the exclusion of conceptual cognition? If so, common sense would readily agree that without an experiential base, no conceptual discourse (“meaningful judgment”) is possible.
(b) Or is Nagarjuna being paradoxical, and saying on the one hand that he has not cognized any objects at all by experience or reason, yet he is able to talk about them enough to tell us that he cannot judge whether or not they exist.
If he can talk about them, then surely he is able to at least apprehend them by conceptual means (in the way of hypothetical objects). If he can do that, then he must have some experience. If he had no experience at all, he would be unable to even talk about “my non-apprehension of the objects of cognition”.
And by the way, in inductive logic, once we have a merely-hypothetical object and some experience however limited, we can by adductive means, i.e. by trial and error, somewhat confirm or weaken the thesis that the object exists (or does not exist). So, a body of valid knowledge, however inductive, can be built up over time with some degree of probability (though not utter certainty).
It is, I submit to you, this paradoxical interpretation (b) that Streng read into verse 30, when he coined the phrase “non-apprehension of non-things”. It seems obvious that the more innocuous common sense interpretation (a) is not Nagarjuna’s intent. I do not think Streng’s “non-things” has to be understood as a reification; I do not think your readings are that far apart. What Streng seems to be doing is emphasizing the inherent paradoxicality of Nagarjuna’s underlying position (whatever the language used for it). You yourself say it:
| Quote: | | But such ordinary logical statements are not the style of Nagarjuna. |
Concerning the Theory of Negation more deeply, now. I would like here to refer you to my book RUMINATIONS, chapter 9, “About Negation”, posted in www.thelogician.net
I there develop various insights, among which:
В· We can directly perceive (or otherwise experience) the presence of some appearances.
В· However, we never directly perceive (or otherwise experience) absence, but rather look for a certain presence and not having found it inductively infer absence (with a degree of probability proportional to our efforts of research).
В· To look for something, we must first think of that thing (i.e. mentally remember it or imagine it or conceptually construct it using words or at least silent intentions).
В· Thus, denial is a very different event, epistemologically, from affirmation.
It is always wise to distinguish deductive and inductive proof.
Perceiving something is proof enough of its presence (both deductively and inductively), provided we understand the “something” phenomenologically (as mere appearance) and do not confuse it with our evaluations and interpretations of it (e.g. “it is real”).
Whereas, failure to perceive something sought (“non-apprehension”, if you like) is not absolute proof of its absence (from a deductive point of view), but it is rightly considered as proof enough (from an inductive point of view) of absence: for all practical purposes, until and unless new evidence appears.
Thus, I am on the same wavelength as Indian philosophers (such as you mention in your post), in asking questions about discourse relative to negations. I just think the language they use to express the difficulties involved is not quite adequate. Being imperfectly articulate, they sometimes fall into paradoxical statements.
For example, you write:
| Quote: | | A non-apprehension, according to Dharmakirti, implies the existence of a particular individual (svabhAva-vizeSa) defined as "a thing which, being present, is necessarily perceived when all other conditions of perceptibility are fulfilled" (NB II.15). A logician can thus say, there is a non-apprehension of a thing. |
To my mind, “non-apprehension of a thing” can be talked of insofar as the term “thing” is a general term that has IN THE PAST been derived from and applied to things that were indeed apprehended by experience. Thus having obtained a concept, we can then use it by analogy in the context of “non-apprehension”. It does not mean that any particular individual is necessarily currently being perceived and known to be present, as Dharmakirti seems to suggest. It just means that we are able to conceive (through our imaginative faculty) that there may be particular individuals that are present and perceivable even though we have not found any sign of them, and which were they to be perceived (which eventuality remains hypothetical) would be classed under the category of “thing”.
Here, note well, “non-apprehension” really means “non-perception”, because if it included non-conception, we would be unable to mention the term “thing” – or indeed, for that matter, the term “non-apprehension” or any other term!
Further on, you ask:
| Quote: | | should ALL anupalabdha (non-apprehended) objects be given the status of prameyatva (objects of valid cognition)? |
Here again, a more precise use of terms is needed to unravel the issues.
Plamen: I could go on analyzing, but I think that is enough for now and await your reactions.
_________________
Avi Sion, Ph.D.
www.thelogician.net |
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