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Avi Sion
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 Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2005 12:42 pm Post subject: on methods of resolving philosophical difficulties |
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to Mary
Mary: I have to confess I am not sufficiently well acquainted with Indian philosophy to be able to comment on Nagarjuna’s historical predicament. I am just a logician, who evaluates whatever doctrine comes his way on its own merits. I could of course say a thing or two about mind-only and fatalist ideas. If you are interested in my views on these topics, check out the first (or first few) chapters of my Phenomenology, and/or read my Buddhist Illogic. These works are posted on www.thelogician.net
The issue of Nagarjuna’s enlightenment is not totally irrelevant, by the way. If he was so, then maybe he is speaking some otherworldly language we the unenlightened cannot understand. But if he is not so, on what basis does he claim to be qualified to tell us about the worldview of the enlightened? We have to assume (as you do too, apparently) that he speaks our ordinary language, and that his discourse is philosophical speculation (about what the enlightenment reported by Buddha Sakyamuni and others might have been). In that case, it is not an authoritative text (to be taken on faith), but on the table for free discussion like all philosophies.
Granting this, we have to judge his work by means of our common sense. There is no question of making historical distinctions about the level of logic in his time and place (this is an issue for historians, not philosophers). And by the way, Aristotle lived a few centuries before (not after) Nagarjuna, and whether Greek formal logic had some influence on Indian logic is an interesting and important question. Our premise has to be: there is only one logic (though humanity’s knowledge of it is admittedly variable in time and place, and from person to person). Otherwise, we are lost in relativism and unable to judge at all. Thus, to briefly reply to your question to me:
| Quote: | | Are there formal logical method that he could have used to accomplish a demonstrable end of extinguishing the two extremes? |
There is no magic formula. But my answer would simply be: yes – the whole range of methods and techniques inductive and deductive logic makes available (see especially my Future Logic). If these “extremes” contain some logical errors, they can be exposed by good logical analysis.
There is no need to try destroying logic for that (alleged) end, like Nagarjuna does. His discourse is effectively, then, a self-admission of defeat – i.e. according to him, logic is on the side of his opponents, so he has to invalidate logic (“by means of” logic) to overcome them.
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Last edited by Avi Sion on Tue Nov 01, 2005 7:24 pm; edited 1 time in total |
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Plamen
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| Posted: Tue Nov 01, 2005 3:41 pm Post subject: |
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| Quote: | | When he speaks about non-apprehension does he mean only non-experience, or does he mean the term generally enough to include conceptual derivatives of experience? |
This refers to the non-perception of all objects of cognition (prameya) no matter what the pramana - be it perception, inference (comparison or authority). Grasping the concomitant connection between two facts is as a matter of fact kind of Wesensschau (paramarsa of samanyatodrsta, intuition of what has been generally seen), so any major premise is formed by a kind of inductive intuition (complete induction, possible only for the Yogic Seers, yogaja-pratyaksa). In our concrete case, anupalabdhi means that the probans is not apprehended in the locus (paksa).
| Quote: | | we never directly perceive (or otherwise experience) absence, but rather look for a certain presence and not having found it inductively infer absence |
This is not the point of view of Nyaya. Absence is directly perceived rather than inferred. I wonder what would be the general rule (vyapti) for inferring the absence of a probans, and what the logical mark (linga) of it. The probans (linga, hetu) is always something perceptible, one cannot infer the probans - it is there, either perceived or not perceived, triggering the inferential process. When it is not perceived, we speak of anupalabdhi (non-apprehension). Which is one of the three marks of the probans.
On the other hand, phenomenologically speaking, inference is but a subdivision of perception. We have first to see the universal connection on the basis of which, seeing one of the facts universally connected, secondly, to see in our mind the presence of the other fact, or, conversely, seeing the absence of the probans to intellectually intuite the absence of the probandum. Or we can see the absence of something when perceiving the presence of the concomitant positive. Strictly speaking, we can infer only the absence of the probandum or the absence as a probandum, not the probans.
Extraordinary people like Buddha, Nagarjuna or Dharmakirti see the universal connections and postulate them as major premises. We, because of our ordinary minds, do not see the interconnectedness of all, and call our perceptual deficiency logic. 
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Plamen Gradinarov, Ph.D., D.Litt.
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Mary
Age: 53 Gender: 
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| Posted: Wed Nov 02, 2005 6:05 am Post subject: More Nagarjuna MMK |
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Plamen & Avi (if you will allow the familiarity),
Avi - you make a very good point on the relevance of N's enlightenment. Also, forgive my earlier wording, I should have specified Aristotelian-based logic.
Plamen - do I understand that you also find Nagarjuna's state of enlightenment to shed illumination on the status of his arguments?
Just a note to thank you both for your kind and most interesting thoughts. I would like to return to the discussion of possible formal-logical approaches Nagarjuna might have made. When I have a bit more time. I hope that will be in the next week or so.
Kind regards,
Mary
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Mary E. Lee, Ph.D. |
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Mary
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| Posted: Wed Nov 02, 2005 6:10 am Post subject: PS - Note to Avi |
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Forgot to mention that I have looked at your sights and your work and find much of interest. Lots of interest - little time over the next week or so.
Regards, Mary
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Avi Sion
Age: 59 Gender:
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| Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2005 10:53 am Post subject: conceptual vs. perceptual apprehension |
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Plamen: thank you for answering my question concerning the term “apprehension” in Nagarjuna:
| Quote: | Avi’s Question:
When he speaks about non-apprehension does he mean only non-experience, or does he mean the term generally enough to include conceptual derivatives of experience?
Plamen’s answer:
This refers to the non-perception of all objects of cognition (prameya) no matter what the pramana - be it perception, inference (comparison or authority). |
It follows from this that the paradoxical interpretation (b) of Nagarjuna’s verse 30 is to be preferred to the commonsense one (a), as I wrote to you:
| Quote: | (a) Does Nagarjuna here mean specifically the objects of experiential cognition, to the exclusion of conceptual cognition? If so, common sense would readily agree that without an experiential base, no conceptual discourse (“meaningful judgment”) is possible.
(b) Or is Nagarjuna being paradoxical, and saying on the one hand that he has not cognized any objects at all by experience or reason, yet he is able to talk about them enough to tell us that he cannot judge whether or not they exist.
If he can talk about them, then surely he is able to at least apprehend them by conceptual means (in the way of hypothetical objects). If he can do that, then he must have some experience. If he had no experience at all, he would be unable to even talk about “my non-apprehension of the objects of cognition”. |
In other words, Nagarjuna is here surfing on an ambiguity (or equivocation) in the term “apprehension”. Prima facie, he is using the term in both a general and a specific sense, which makes his statement potentially a common sense view (a). However, deeper down, he is claiming both conceptual non-apprehension (as well as perceptual non-apprehension) in the antecedent, and conceptual apprehension (by his ability to talk about the antecedent) in the consequent – this is the paradox underlying his thesis, and is I believe quite intentional.
What do you say to that?
With regard to your statement concerning knowledge of logical connections:
| Quote: | | Grasping the concomitant connection between two facts is as a matter of fact kind of Wesensschau (paramarsa of samanyatodrsta, intuition of what has been generally seen), so any major premise is formed by a kind of inductive intuition… |
I would of course agree, as can be seen in my own writings (e.g. Phenomenology). I was also interested by your following comment about my view of negation:
This is not the point of view of Nyaya. Absence is directly perceived rather than inferred.
In that case, I would strongly recommend you read chapter 9 “About Negation” in my Ruminations, in [url]www.thelogician.net [/url]
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Avi Sion
Age: 59 Gender:
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| Posted: Thu Nov 03, 2005 10:57 am Post subject: irrelevance of enlightenment |
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Additionally, I think Mary was very right to underscore this statement by Plamen:
| Quote: | | Extraordinary people like Buddha, Nagarjuna or Dharmakirti see the universals and postulate them as major premises. We, because of our ordinary minds, do not see the interconnectedness of all, and call our perceptual deficiency logic. |
when she asks the question:
| Quote: | | Plamen - do I understand that you also find Nagarjuna's state of enlightenment to shed illumination on the status of his arguments? |
In this context, I would like to say the following. Anyone can stand up and claim enlightenment, or similarly Divine revelation, or even being a god or God. Many people throughout history have made such claims: Moses, Buddha, Jesus, Mohammed, the Pharaoh, your local Shaman, Mister Moon, and many other nameless, colorful personages.
It may, in this case or in that case, be true or false – but who can tell? Consciousness is something very private (till now, at least). Sometimes two or more people confirm each other’s claim. Sometimes one claims the other wrong. But who is to qualify the qualifiers?
Sometimes, the one making claims deep down knows himself or herself to be a charlatan out for power or lucre. Some individuals sincerely believe their own claims and acquire thousands, millions or billions of faithful disciples. But this proves nothing per se.
It is, I think, easier to eliminate false claims than to prove true claims. This is an issue of induction rather than deduction. See for instance my comments on this topic in chapter 2 of Judaic Logic in www.thelogician.net . In practice, generally, we would all agree that morally reprehensible behavior is a sure sign of low spirituality and therefore of non-enlightenment or divine connection, etc. And, although pure and kind behavior is a good index of high spirituality, it does not by itself constitute proof of enlightenment or divine mission or any such elevated status.
Now my point is this: Philosophy cannot be built up on the basis of some esoteric perspective. You can construct a Religion on such basis, but not a Philosophy. The latter can only refer to experiences and insights that can readily be duplicated, i.e. that are within everyone’s reach if they consider certain empirical data and follow a set of inductive and deductive arguments. Philosophy is an exoteric discipline, and cannot be made handmaiden to any Religion’s premises. This is the conviction of all serious philosophers, acquired historically after much labor.
Saying this is not necessarily taking a dogmatic anti-religious stance. It is just a recognition that esoteric claims, however conceivably true and evidently sincere and worthy within the one making the claim, can only be taken on faith by other, more ordinary minds. The latter can legitimately accept on faith that there is such a thing as nirvana (enlightenment/liberation) or as God (in monotheistic religions), and pursue the goals their spiritual leaders instruct them to pursue – but this is not Philosophy, it is Religion. Philosophers may and should readily conceive of the possibility of the truth of religion(s), and remain open-minded, for the simple reason that upon reflection such transcendental claims are indeed logically conceivable. But this is very different from a dogmatic pro-religious stance.
Thus, though Nagarjuna may well claim to have achieved Buddhist enlightenment, and even be believed by many, his statements concerning the validity or invalidity of logic from such alleged superior perspective is TOTALLY IRRELEVANT to Philosophy. It may be relevant to Religion, but not to Philosophy, which is only concerned with secular, exoteric matters – with data and cognitive means accessible to all human beings (except perhaps some with damaged organs).
This is what I meant earlier: if Nagarjuna’s discourse is viewed as religion, I have nothing to say about it. But if it is claimed as philosophy, its logic may be subjected to severe criticism. I assume Plamen and Mary agree on this.
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Plamen
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| Posted: Fri Nov 04, 2005 5:22 pm Post subject: Re: conceptual vs. perceptual apprehension |
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| Avi wrote: | | Nagarjuna... is claiming both conceptual non-apprehension (as well as perceptual non-apprehension) in the antecedent, and conceptual apprehension (by his ability to talk about the antecedent) in the consequent – this is the paradox underlying his thesis, and is I believe quite intentional. |
The non-apprehension of any form of prameya should be, in my limited knowledge, itself form of pratyaksa, say, I didn't witnessed the object you claim to have perceived, I didn't touch the fire you claim to have inferred by means of syllogism, I didn't see the two objects to be compared, and I didn't get the instructions of an apta (authority). The same with the respective pramanas. This is the meaning of the
| Quote: | | non-perception of all objects of cognition (prameya) no matter what the pramana - be it perception, inference (comparison or authority). |
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Avi Sion
Age: 59 Gender:
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| Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2005 11:25 am Post subject: Theory of negation |
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To Plamen and Pandeia:
Concerning the discussion with Plamen on the Theory of negation, where I say:
| Quote: | | we never directly perceive (or otherwise experience) absence, but rather look for a certain presence and not having found it inductively infer absence. |
And Plamen replies:
| Quote: | | This is not the point of view of Nyaya. Absence is directly perceived rather than inferred. I wonder what would be the general rule (vyapti) for inferring the absence of anything, and what the logical mark (linga) of it. |
Reading the earlier post of Pandeia, in which he apparently quotes “Illocution, No-Theory and Practice in Nagarjuna’s Skepticism: Reflections on the Vigrahavyavartani” by Douglas L. Berger, saying “as far as anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) is concerned” –
| Quote: | | Another typically Naiyayika objection thematized by Nagarjuna in verse nine is the charge that, with the term nihsvabhava (no self-nature), Nagarjuna actually means absence (abhava) of self nature. In his Nyayasutra, Gautama identifies abhava to be a prameya, and uses the example of marked and unmarked cloths to show that, were one asked to pick up the unmarked cloths, one would do so because one could perceive the absence of marks on those cloths. (15) Vatsyayana, in his commentary on this verse adds that, since the cause of the appropriate response in this case (bringing the unmarked cloths) was the apprehension of the marks’ absence, abhava must not only be an object but also a valid cognition. So the argument would go with Nagarjuna that, if one believed that things in the world had no self-nature, this must be because one cognized the absence of self-nature in those things. But then this very absence becomes self-nature, and this being the case, Nagarjuna’s claim that things are void cannot hold good. Again, Nagarjuna can here object that this conflation of absence with no self-nature can do no harm to him, for by the later term he doesn’t mean the absence of essence, nor does he mean the "non-existence" of essence. (16) Instead, in Vigrahavyavartani, 1:30. Nagarjuna denies the very idea that he "apprehends" anything, and so he must make no affirmative or negative judgment concerning the matter. |
I begin to wonder whether my position on this issue is not (partly) closer to Nagarjuna than to the Nyaya. For what I am saying, in the terms of this quotation, is:
A mark can be perceived, but the absence of a mark is only inferred from non-perception of a mark. Absence has no distinct mark, only presence does.
The difference with Nagarjuna would then rather be that I soberly admit inference of absence (of a mark) to be conceptual apprehension (although it is not perceptual apprehension), whereas he wildly flies off into a paradoxical claim of non-apprehension at all (neither positive or negative, neither experiential nor inferential). Nagarjuna’s extreme conclusion is thus a non-sequitur, as well as antinomous.
This is said leaving aside talk of “self-nature” or “non-self-nature”, which refers to another issue. I am here discussing the phenomenal level, without reference to underlying essences.
The other passage by Berger, quoted by Pandeia, comforts me too:
| Quote: | | Uddyotakara claims that Nagarjuna, in simultaneously attempting to prove there are no means of valid cognition and showing that all things are empty, contradicts his own statement (svavacana vyaghata ), Nyayavartika, under Nyayasutra 2,1:12. |
I would agree with Uddyotakara that Nagarjuna is in contradiction.
“Apprehension” means apprehension OF [something, some experiential or abstract object – call it X]; there is no such thing as apprehension pure and simple. Even in the enlightenment experience, “apprehension of emptiness” may be said to have a logical object. The logical opposite of “apprehension of X” is not just “non-apprehension” but “non-(apprehension OF X). The negation here negates the whole term negated (including the grammatical complement), not just part of it.
Also the following quotation of Berger:
| Quote: | | In his classic defense of Madhyamika, T.R.V. Murti argued that "the dialectic is a series of reductio ad absurdum arguments (prasangapadaman ). Every thesis is turned against itself...It accepts a particular thesis hypothetically, and by eliciting its implications shows up the inner contradictions that have escaped the notice of the opponent." The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1960) 131-2. However, this kind of methodical use of prasanga seems to reinforce Uddyotakara’s charge that the Madhyamika practices vada-vitanda rather than refute it. |
I concur, having shown in Buddhist Illogic that Nagarjuna’s arguments are not logical as Murti claims but quite the opposite.
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Avi Sion, Ph.D.
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Avi Sion
Age: 59 Gender:
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| Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2005 11:26 am Post subject: VV translation |
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Looking at the VV translation posted in Orientalia, which is probably by the same Frederick J. Streng, two reflections immediately come to mind concerning the structure of this text:
a) It is divided into two parts:
PART 1 - The Arguments of the Opponents (verses 1-20)
PART II - Nagarjuna's Reply to the Arguments of the Opponents (verses 21-70)
But presumably, both parts were authored by Nagarjuna. That is, his description of what his opponents say or might say is his own, presumably. This should be kept in mind, for we cannot be sure from this document alone that Nagarjuna is correctly perceiving or representing the arguments of his opponents (if any such existed). Note that the opponents are apparently themselves replying to previous claims by Nagarjuna.
Moreover, his attempt to answer the arguments he has taken into consideration should not be construed as meaning he has answered all possible counterarguments – whether because he knew of them but deliberately ignored them, or because he did not know of them or understand them. It is silly to assume ab initio, as some his enthusiasts do, that Nagarjuna is necessarily omniscient and supremely intelligent and perfectly honest.
b) This presentation (in two parts) may seem orderly, but it is not such as to clarify which of the opponents’ argument is intended by which of Nagarjuna’s alleged counterargument. I do not know how the original text was set out – but in the present format tends to blur and confuse the issues. Maybe that was the intention.
The ideal way to set the debate out would be to put side by side each point made by �the opponents’ and each answer to it by Nagarjuna, or at least to cross-reference the two sets. I wonder if any writer has already analyzed the text, and convincingly paired off the listed �replies’ and �arguments’?
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Androsov
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| Posted: Tue Nov 08, 2005 4:33 pm Post subject: Arranging Vigraha-vyavartani |
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In my Nagarjuna's Buddhism, pp. 297-338, I have arranged the opponent's karikas and the Nagarjuna's replies in the following way:
1 - 21, 22, 23
2 - 24
3 - 25, 26, 27, 28
4 - 29
5, 6 - 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51
7, 8 - 52, 53, 54, 55, 56
9 - 57, 58, 59
10 - 60
11 - 61, 62, 63
12 - 64
13, 14, 15, 16 - 65, 66, 67
17, 18, 19 - 68
20 - 69, 70 |
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