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Plamen
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 Posted: Thu Sep 29, 2005 5:57 pm Post subject: Averting Arguments: Nagarjuna’s Verse 29 |
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Averting Arguments: Nagarjuna’s Verse 29
by S. K. Wertz
Texas Christian University
swertz@gamma.is.tcu.edu
ABSTRACT: I examine Nagarjuna’s averting an opponent’s argument (Verse 29 of Averting the Arguments), Paul Sagal’s general interpretation of Nagarjuna and especially Sagal’s conception of "averting" an argument. Following Matilal, a distinction is drawn between locutionary negation and illocationary negation in order to avoid errant interpretations of verse 29 ("If I would make any proposition whatever, then by that I would have a logical error. But I do not make a proposition; therefore, I am not in error.") The argument is treated as representing an ampliative or inductive inference rather than a deductive one. As Nagarjuna says in verse 30: "That [denial] of mine [in verse 29] is a non-apprehension of non-things" and non-apprehension is the averting of arguments or "the relinquishing of all views." "Not making a proposition P" would be not speaking P or silence with regard to P (where P is some opposing view) and, as Sagal argues, not meaning a global linguistic silence (where P stands for any proposition whatsoever). Such an interpretation would lead to attributing wholesale irrationalism to Nagarjuna-something I wish to avoid.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Mon Oct 03, 2005 10:01 am Post subject: Nagarjuna's "negation" |
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About this argument of Nagarjuna's, I wrote the following in RUMINATIONS, chapter 5.2:
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The Buddhist philosopher Nagarjuna (India, c. 150-250 CE) attacked every thesis he regarded as rational by every means he regarded as logical, and declared his own discourse immune from scrutiny and criticism, by saying:
“If I had a thesis, I would be at fault; since I alone have no thesis, I alone am without fault” (Averting Argument, verse 29).
The first aspect of Nagarjuna’s statement is a brazen claim to have no claim. This is of course self-contradictory. Every proposition that claims to be meaningful and true is an assertion, a claim. There is no logical way to criticize the theses or methodologies of others without opening one’s own discourse to evaluation. To pretend such a thing logically possible is dishonest (and if such pretense implicitly is bad enough, it is all the more dishonest if made explicitly).
Nagarjuna’s discourse was, in fact (as I show in Buddhist Illogic), shock full of fallacious arguments, a mere parody of logic posing as logic. But he knew that people untrained in logic would fall for it, and he sealed their intellectual fate with the said eyewash claim. To neutralize further discussion, he misled them into believing he had simply shown up the logical absurdity of logic, and all doctrines based on it, but had himself posited no methodology or doctrine of his own.
Not only was his alleged refutation of reason full of errors of reasoning, but his concluding �no-claim claim’ was also a mockery of logic and sincerity. He, of course, just says �I make no claim’ – and he persistently denies that this statement constitutes a claim. I call that shameless psychological manipulation, motivated by one-upmanship. He cynically takes advantage of the credulity of some people, to dominate them intellectually.
The second aspect of Nagarjuna’s above statement can be viewed as a �soft’ version of the Liar paradox, since he tells us: everyone but me is in error. Although such a statement is not in itself inconsistent (God could conceivably utter it truthfully) – it is logically open to doubt due to being self-exempting.
Effectively, it says: �I am the only human who has knowledge; I know everyone else is incapable of true knowledge’. Only a fool is tricked by such an unsubstantiated claim to privilege. Reason regards all people as technically within range of knowledge given enough effort, even if they do not all fulfill their potential equally. Reason demands that discourse be reasoned and fair – i.e. based on common general norms as to how truth and falsehood are to be determined.
If Nagarjuna were basing his criticism of ordinary human means to knowledge on a claim to have attained a �higher level’ of consciousness (i.e. Buddhist enlightenment or Biblical prophesy), we could not convincingly oppose him (being unable to prove or disprove such experiential claims). But he is not using such as claim as his basis – he is attempting to debunk reason through ordinary logical discourse. In that case, he is fair game for logic.
The statement of infallibility is then seen as manifest arrogance, a lack of respect for other thinkers. By saying �I alone am exempt from any criticism’ the author aggressively grants himself a special dispensation: he alone is endowed with the way to knowledge; everyone else is an idiot or a dishonest person. It is totalitarian, dictatorial speech.
Compare this dismissive �you all know nothing’, to the self-inclusive statement �I (or we) know nothing’. The latter – even though it implies �I know that I know nothing’ and is therefore self-inconsistent – is at least modest; so much so, that such admission is widely considered a mark of wisdom (and it is commendable, in modified form, i.e. as �I know close to nothing, very little’).
Self-exemption is a hidden form of self-inconsistency, because it resorts to a double standard. The one making such a claim presents superficially rational arguments against human experience and logic, but does not ask himself or tell us how he (an ordinary human) managed (using the very cognitive means he rejects) to attain such allegedly true knowledge. The author criticizes others, but does not equally well criticize himself.
This is a fallacious mode of thought often found among would-be skeptical philosophers. It comes in many subtle forms. It is wise to always be on the lookout for such practices, applying the reflexive test here demonstrated.
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| Posted: Mon Oct 17, 2005 10:58 am Post subject: More comments on verse 29 |
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Looking at Nagarjuna’s above statement in more detail, the following may be added. (from RUMINATIONS, chapter 5.3)
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To begin with, what is meant here by “having a thesis”? This refers to any explicit or even wordless belief, any clear or even vague opinion upheld (considered to constitute knowledge), any proposition one advocates or implicitly logically condones. The subject that Nagarjuna is here discussing is any outcome of human rational cognition, any belief, opinion or doctrine that one may arrive at, rightly or wrongly, by means of ordinary consciousness, i.e. through experience, abstraction, hypothesizing, inductive or deductive argument.
And what is meant here by “being at fault”? This refers to making a mistake in the course of observation or reasoning, so that some thesis one has adhered to is in fact an illusion rather than a reality, false rather than true, erroneous instead of correct. How do we know the status appropriate to a thesis? We know it (I suggest) by holistic application of the whole science of logic to the totality of the data of experience. Our concepts of cognitive right or wrong are themselves all constructed by logic and experience, without appeal to some extraordinary outside justification (like prophetic revelation or mystical realization, or simply the authority of some great personage or of a religious document or institution).
Now, Nagarjuna is evidently well aware of all that, but is intent on annulling the independent reliability of ordinary experience and reason. His strategy and tactics to this end, in all his discourse, as I have shown throughout my Buddhist Illogic, is to give the impression (however paradoxical) that logic may be invalidated by means of logic. And this twofold sentence of his, “If I had a thesis, I would be at fault; since I alone have no thesis, I alone am without fault”, fits neatly into his destructive philosophical programme.
On the surface, this sentence might be construed as a single argument:
If X (a proposition is proposed), then Y (an error is made)
but not X (no proposition)
therefore not Y (no error)
Although the above apodosis is logically invalid, since it denies the antecedent to deny the consequent, Nagarjuna is not above letting it pass without comment, knowing it will suffice to convince some people, although he is well aware that the logically trained will spot it and object. But for the latter audience, he reserves a more subtle form of manipulation.
It has to be seen that the purpose of this famous Verse 29 in Nagarjuna’s discourse is designed to make a show of logical consistency. He wants by means of it to give the impression that his anti-rational discourse is justifiable, that it has the stamp of approval of logic. Yes, he is actually attacking logic; but at the same time, he has to pretend to use it, because he knows this measure is required to convince people. For most people, a veneer of logic (i.e. mere rhetoric) suffices to put their reason’s critical faculty at rest. We shall now see how he goes about this task.
The first part of Nagarjuna’s statement, viz. “If I had a thesis, I would be at fault”, is not intended (as some have assumed) as a justification for his overall discourse. It is not placed here in his discourse as an argument with intrinsic force, which directly buttresses or proves his philosophy. It is certainly not an obvious logical principle, or axiom, which everyone would agree on without objection, from which his discourse can be inferred or even generalized. No – it is itself an inference and application from Nagarjuna’s main thesis, namely the claim that �All human knowledge based on ordinary experience and reason is necessarily erroneous’.
The latter underlying claim is his major premise in a (here tacit) productive eduction, i.e. one that deduces a particular hypothetical proposition from a more general categorical one . This argument is formally valid, running as follows:
All X (opinions) are necessarily Y (erroneous);
therefore,
If this is X (a proposition is proposed), then this is Y (an error is made).
In this way, the first part of Nagarjuna’s statement is made to seem something inferred, rather than an arbitrary claim. It is cunningly presented as an application of already admitted information, rather than as an isolated assertion. Granting the premise, the conclusion indeed logically follows (this is the veneer of logic) – but has the premise already been granted? No. Also note, once the conclusion is seemingly drawn, it can by generalization be used to reinforce the premise; although this is a circularity, it works psychologically.
Moreover, Nagarjuna manages through this implicit productive argument to pretend he is being consistent with himself: he is telling us, effectively: �See, I am not just attacking other people’s knowledge, but am prepared to apply the same stringent critique to my own!’ This virtuous declaration is of course dust in your eyes, because he is not here putting the broader principle in doubt but merely reaffirming it. He has nowhere established that �All propositions are false’. His is a pseudo-logical posture.
As the next part of his statement clarifies, he does not consider his discourse as falling under the critical rule he has formulated. The proposition “If I had a thesis, I would be at fault” is a counterfactual hypothetical; his own discourse is never made into an issue open to debate. It seems open-minded, but it is a foregone judgment. His intention is to �avert all arguments’ and place himself at the outset outside the fray. He seemingly at first admits and then vehemently denies that his own discourse is a product of ordinary consciousness. This convoluted avoidance of cognitive responsibility has fooled many a poor soul.
Moving on, now, to the second part of Nagarjuna’s statement, viz. “since I alone have no thesis, I alone am without fault”. As already pointed out, this can be viewed as the minor premise and conclusion of an invalid apodosis in which the first part of the statement is the major premise. But we could also more generously assume that Nagarjuna intended a valid apodosis, using as its tacit major premise the obvious proposition: �If one has no thesis, one cannot make a mistake’.
It can be correctly argued that this premise was left tacit simply because it is so obvious to and readily granted by everyone. It is indeed true that if one ventures no utterance, thought or even intention, if one holds no opinion, makes no claim to knowledge, if one remains inwardly and outwardly silent, one will never make any errors. For the status of truth or falsehood is only applicable to meaningful assertions.
A stone is never in error, because it has no thoughts. Likewise, a thoughtless person may by his or her ignorance, blindness or stupidity make many errors of living, but makes no error in the logical sense of having proposed an inappropriate proposition. All that is so obvious (and vacuous) no debating it is necessary. The following apodosis is thus implicit in Nagarjuna’s declaration:
If not X (no proposition is proposed), then Y (no error is made)
but not X (no proposition)
therefore not Y (no error)
This argument has a true major premise, as well as a valid form. This gives his discourse a veneer of logic again, helping him to persuade more victims. However, his minor premise remains well open to doubt, and decisively deniable! (As a consequence of which, his conclusion is of course also open to doubt.) He takes it for granted that he �has no thesis’ – but this claim is far from granted already. The tacit major premise acts as a smokescreen for the minor premise.
Moreover, note, although �being correct’ implies �not being at fault’, the reverse is not necessary. Nagarjuna suggests that his alleged faultlessness implies the correctness of his position, but it does not follow! Only if his criticism of all opposing theses was correct (which is by no stretch of the imagination true), and his thesis was not liable to similar criticism and was therefore the only leftover logical possibility, would such inference be drawn.
Nagarjuna does indeed �have a thesis’. His main thesis, the goal of his whole philosophical discourse, is as already mentioned the claim that �All human knowledge based on ordinary experience and reason is necessarily erroneous’. This, for a start, qualifies as a thesis – boy, it is a big skeptical thesis, full of negative implications. It is a principle of logic that to deny any thesis is to affirm an opposite thesis. His claim that his doctrine is not a thesis, in the minor premise here, is mere arbitrary assertion.
Furthermore, he �has a thesis’ every time he makes a specific assertion of any kind, including the assertion under scrutiny here, viz. “If I had a thesis, I would be at fault; since I alone have no thesis, I alone am without fault”. Note that Nagarjuna thinks that making a negative statement is somehow �not having a thesis’ – but the polarity of a statement does not diminish the need for justification; if anything, one can argue that on the contrary negative statements are harder to establish than positive ones!
And we should strictly include as �theses’ of his not only such explicit statements, but also all the implicit assumptions and suggestions within his discourse (like the implicit major premise and resulting apodosis we have just highlighted). It makes no difference whether these explicit, or unstated and unadmitted, items constitute information or logical method, content or process.
For all these elements of discourse, be they spoken or otherwise intended, in all fairness fit in our common understanding and definition as to what it means to �have a thesis’. For none of these categorical or hypothetical propositions (except perhaps �if silence, no error’) is self-evident. They did not arise ex nihilo in Nagarjuna’s mind, ready-made and self-justified.
They are all complex products of ordinary human cognition, based on experience and produced by reason (even if, in Nagarjuna’s case, the mind involved is deranged). They undeniably together form a specific philosophy, a theory of logic, an epistemology and ontology. The mere fact that we can (as here done) at all consider and debate them is proof that they are �theses’.
The law of identity (A is A) must be maintained: facts are facts and it is no use pretending otherwise. Nagarjuna may eternally refuse the predicate of “having a thesis”, but we confidently insist on it. His arguments have in no way succeeded in averting this just and true judgment. Consequently, his doctrine is self-contradictory. Not only does he �have a thesis’, but since his thesis is that �to have a thesis is to be in error’, he has (by its own terms) to be recognized as being in error.
Thus, to end it: Nagarjuna’s statement “If I had a thesis, I would be at fault; since I alone have no thesis, I alone am without fault” weaves a complicated web of deception. It misleads, by means of subtle ambiguities and superficial imitations of logic. Once its dishonesty is revealed, it should be decidedly rejected.
The mere historic fact that Nagarjuna is famous and admired by many does not justify hanging on to his doctrine ad nauseam, trying ex post facto to find ways to make it consistent with logic. Celebrity is not proof of some hidden truth – it is vanity. Most who do so are merely grasping for reflected glory. Anyway, attachment to authority is argument ad hominem. The religious and academic �groupies’ who gave him and perpetuate his authority are not logically competent, however numerous they be. It is a case of the blind leading the blind.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Thu Oct 20, 2005 12:49 pm Post subject: concerning verse 30 |
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From RUMINATIONS, chapter 5.4
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Nagarjuna defends his �non-thesis’ idea in the next verse, describing it as “a non-apprehension of non-things”. Now, this is a very funny phrase. To the impressionable, it sounds very deep, pregnant with meaning. It seems to suggest this man has some privileged higher way of knowledge that goes beyond ordinary experience and reasoning.
But in truth, taken literally, we are all quite capable of “non-apprehension of non-things” and daily practice it, for the simple reason that non-things cannot be apprehended! Logically, this is all this phrase means, note well. What then is the old fox up to, here?
Nagarjuna is trying to project his �not having a thesis’ position as far as logically possible from our plebian �having a thesis’ – i.e. from ordinary consciousness, which consists in �the apprehension of things’. He has logically only three alternatives to choose from:
* the �non-apprehension of things’ (unconsciousness);
* the �apprehension of non-things’ (an otherworldly consciousness);
* or the �non-apprehension of non-things’.
Having a marked taste for one-upmanship and dramatic extremes, Nagarjuna of course chose the third of these terms as his vehicle. Even though the obvious sense of this phrase is puerile, it has poetic breadth and appeal. It seems to imply �knowledge without consciousness’ and �consciousness of the unknowable’ all at once.
Thus, his �non-apprehension’ is mix of apprehension and non-apprehension, or something else again. And likewise, his �non-things’ are things of some sort as well as non-things, or perhaps something quite other still.
In other words, the negative terms in the phrase “non-apprehension of non-things” are not intended by Nagarjuna nor received by his disciples and students as mere negations of the corresponding positive terms, but as paradoxical terms, which may (in accord with the tetralemma schema) be all at once positive or negative or both or neither.
It is (and isn’t) �apprehension/non-apprehension of things/non-things’ all in one.
Nagarjuna stands out in the history of world philosophy as the most unabashed opponent of the laws of thought. Not only does he freely use self-contradictory or middle-including propositions, but he even makes use of terms loaded with contradiction and inclusion of a middle.
Now, some people might say: �what is wrong with that?’ They will argue: �the real world is extremely subtle and we can only ever hope to express it in thought very approximately; Nagarjuna is only trying to take this uncertainty into consideration within his discourse; the laws of thought are just arbitrary demands, making us force our thoughts into prejudicial straightjackets’.
But logical laxity is not the proper attitude in the face of an extremely complex and hard to express real world. It is precisely because of the great difficulty of the cognitive task at hand that one is called upon to be very clear and careful. Avoiding checks and balances on our judgments does not increase their efficiency but makes them less reliable.
In the case under consideration, if Nagarjuna does indeed have some privileged form of otherworldly consciousness, he can just say so. The laws of thought in no way forbid him to posit such a claim. He does not need to beat about the bush, and pretend to have something unspeakable and not subject to peer review. He can and should be forthright, and defend his position in an equitable way like everyone else.
If he considers the terms �apprehension’ and �things’ to have some intrinsic logical flaw, he can argue his case openly; he does not need to engage in allusion, suggestion and fallacious argument. Most of us thinkers are open-minded and willing to correct our errors: if these terms are flawed, we are not attached to them; we are flexible, ready to modify or replace them as logically necessary in the light of new evidence and reasoning.
But Nagarjuna is like an accused, who when forced to appear in court refuses to admit his identity, or recognize the authority of the law and the judges, or plead guilty or not guilty, or argue the defense of his case. Worse still, in utter contempt of the court, he does not even admit his refusal to be a refusal – he calls it a �non-thesis’. Does that stop court proceedings or make the court declare him innocent? Surely not.
Nagarjuna misunderstands the nature of negation. He thinks that if one person says �X’ and another says �not X’, the onus of proof is on the first more than on the second. He considers that making a positive statement is more logically demanding than making a negative one. He imagines in his confusion that saying �no’ is equivalent to saying nothing, i.e. to not saying anything. Most logicians would disagree with him, and argue that any thesis put forward (even if only by insinuation) is equally in need of proof, whatever its polarity.
I would go further and say that, on the contrary, a negative statement is more demanding than a positive one. You can prove a positive statement easily enough, if you point to sufficient evidence in its favor. But how do you prove a negative statement? It is much more difficult, since negatives are not directly experienced but are only experienced by way of the absence of positives. A negative can ultimately only be proved indirectly, by inability to prove any contrary positive.
Thus, in fact, not only does Nagarjuna’s alleged self-limitation to negatives not exempt him from proofs, but on the contrary it increases the logical burden upon him. He is right in considering negatives as significantly different from positives, but he does not realize that the difference is to his disadvantage. He claims to have no epistemological or ontological basis, and yet to be able to reject offhand all theories of knowledge and reality. Such a grandiose fanciful claim surely requires much more justification than any other!
It should be stressed, incidentally, that Nagarjuna’s “non-apprehension of non-things” should not be interpreted (as some do) as a defense of non-verbal meditative experience or insight. That is not the thrust of his anti-rational philosophy, although its avowed Buddhist affiliation may lead one to suppose so. If Nagarjuna were a man deeply absorbed in meditation, he would not be writing philosophy. If his intent were to promote meditation, he would simply teach methods of meditation and not stir up verbal disputes. No – this man has philosophical ambitions. Allegedly, these are meant to put into words some of the �reasoning’ that he considered the Buddha to have gone through before attaining enlightenment. Nagarjuna assumes from the start that this �reasoning’ is necessarily anti-logical, a rejection of reason.
But we must see that this assumption is just a prejudice of his distorted mind. He was a philosophical revolutionary – one who believed that reason has to be overturned, to be transcended. But it is more credible to be evolutionary – and to consider meditation as a way for us to keep moving, beyond the limits of discursive thought, without need to deny such thought within its applicable bounds.
To advocate respect for logic is not to foment endless babble, but rather to require that any thought arising be subjected to responsible cognitive evaluation. Logic is possible entirely without words, by means of silent intentions. Even in deep meditation, some sort of �reality check’ by means of logic occurs, and this need not involve any words. It is only by this means, no doubt, that a Buddha-to-be may steer himself well clear of common illusions and insane imaginings, towards to full realization.
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Pandeia
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| Posted: Thu Oct 20, 2005 7:29 pm Post subject: |
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| Quote: | Uddyotakara claims that Nagarjuna, in simultaneously attempting to prove there are no means of valid cognition and showing that all things are empty, contradicts his own statement (svavacana vyaghata ), Nyayavartika, under Nyayasutra 2,1:12.
In his classic defense of Madhyamika, T.R.V. Murti argued that "the dialectic is a series of reductio ad absurdum arguments (prasangapadaman ). Every thesis is turned against itself...It accepts a particular thesis hypothetically, and by eliciting its implications shows up the inner contradictions that have escaped the notice of the opponent." The Central Philosophy of Buddhism: A Study of the Madhyamika System. (George Allen and Unwin Ltd., London, 1960) 131-2. However, this kind of methodical use of prasanga seems to reinforce Uddyotakara’s charge that the Madhyamika practices vada-vitanda rather than refute it. |
in: Illocution, No-Theory and Practice in Nagarjuna’s Skepticism: Reflections on the Vigrahavyavartani
by Douglas L. Berger
Temple Univeristy
ABSTRACT: In verse nine of the Vigrahavyavartani, Nagarjuna gives a defense of his skepticism by insisting that he makes no proposition (pratijna) concerning the nature of reality. B. K. Matilal has argued that this position is not an untenable one for a skeptic to hold, using as an explanatory model Searle’s distinction between a propositional and an illocutionary negation. The argument runs that Nagarjuna does not refute rival philosophical positions by simply refuting whatever positive claims those positions might make, but rather he refuses the very act of making an assertion. From this kind of illocutionary negation, however, a certain paradoxicality arises: for in the negating the act of assertion, the skeptic is barred from asserting his or her own position, for under this condition, if he or she asserts that position, it is falsified! I want to argue that there are certain senses in which it seems that Nagarjuna’s resorting to the illocution we find in the Vigrahavyavartani may not have been necessary for the maintenance of his skeptical position, for he has recourse to prasanga counter-arguments which can always offset the metaphysical and epistemological claims of the Hindu and Buddhist philosophers whom he confronts. There are also places in the Karika itself, where certain pramanas seem to be employed, that give one the impression that this kind of skepticism and the pramanas are only inimical to one another insofar as the latter may lead to the metaphysical, essentialist extremes criticized by the Buddhists. Nagarjuna’s illocution in this light seems an attempt to radicalize his difference from a developing Nyaya extensionalist theory of the pramanas, a theory in which the Buddhists and the Naiyayikas are closer than anywhere else.
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As far as anupalabdhi (non-apprehension) is concerned:
| Quote: | | Another typically Naiyayika objection thematized by Nagarjuna in verse nine is the charge that, with the term nihsvabhava (no self-nature), Nagarjuna actually means absence (abhava) of self nature. In his Nyayasutra, Gautama identifies abhava to be a prameya, and uses the example of marked and unmarked cloths to show that, were one asked to pick up the unmarked cloths, one would do so because one could perceive the absence of marks on those cloths. (15) Vatsyayana, in his commentary on this verse adds that, since the cause of the appropriate response in this case (bringing the unmarked cloths) was the apprehension of the marks’ absence, abhava must not only be an object but also a valid cognition. So the argument would go with Nagarjuna that, if one believed that things in the world had no self-nature, this must be because one cognized the absence of self-nature in those things. But then this very absence becomes self-nature, and this being the case, Nagarjuna’s claim that things are void cannot hold good. Again, Nagarjuna can here object that this conflation of absence with no self-nature can do no harm to him, for by the later term he doesn’t mean the absence of essence, nor does he mean the "non-existence" of essence. (16) Instead, in Vigrahavyavartani, 1:30. Nagarjuna denies the very idea that he "apprehends" anything, and so he must make no affirmative or negative judgment concerning the matter. |
.......
See http://www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Asia/AsiaBerg.htm |
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Plamen
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| Posted: Thu Oct 20, 2005 9:19 pm Post subject: Non-apprehension |
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If we have a look at the Sanskrit text of VV 30, I don't see how one could construe the expression "non-apprehension of non-things." What we rather have is a reply to VV 5 and 6 voicing the objections of the opponent (surely a Naiyayika) to the effect that if things are rejected even when perceived, then there would be no cognitive means to grasp them, because, there being no perception, the reality of inference will be also negated, as well as that of the verbal authority and comparison, along with all the objects to be grasped by the said pramANas.
To this Nagarjuna replies:
yadi kiM cid upalabheyaM pravartayeyaM nivartayeyaM vA |
pratyakSAdibhir arthais tadabhAvAn me 'nupAlambhaH || 30
If something was apprehended by means of perception and the other [pramANas], these objects could be accepted or rejected, but because of the absence of that, what follows is my non-apprehension.
If I grasped an object by means of the four valid means of cognition, i.e., pratyakSa, anumAna, upamAna, and zabda, or with any of them, then I would either recognize it or reject it. But since I don't make any contentions about the things, i.e., neither declare them actual, nor reject them, what follows is that I don't apprehend them. Because to make such claims (pratijna) one evidently has first to apprehend the object of the claim. |
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Paramatthaka
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| Posted: Sat Oct 22, 2005 5:03 pm Post subject: Paramatthaka Sutta |
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Sutta Nipata IV.5
Paramatthaka Sutta
On Views
Translated from the Pali by John D. Ireland
For free distribution only,
by arrangement with the Buddhist Publication Society
From The Discourse Collection: Selected Texts from the Sutta Nipata (WH 82), translated by John D. Ireland (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1983).
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"A person who associates himself with certain views, considering them as best and making them supreme in the world, he says, because of that, that all other views are inferior; therefore he is not free from contention (with others). In what is seen, heard, cognized and in ritual observances performed, he sees a profit for himself. Just by laying hold of that view he regards every other view as worthless. Those skilled (in judgment)[1] say that (a view becomes) a bond if, relying on it, one regards everything else as inferior. Therefore a bhikkhu should not depend on what is seen, heard or cognized, nor upon ritual observances. He should not present himself as equal to, nor imagine himself to be inferior, nor better than, another. Abandoning (the views) he had (previously) held and not taking up (another), he does not seek a support even in knowledge. Among those who dispute he is certainly not one to take sides. He does not [have] recourse to a view at all. In whom there is no inclination to either extreme, for becoming or non-becoming, here or in another existence, for him there does not exist a fixed viewpoint on investigating the doctrines assumed (by others). Concerning the seen, the heard and the cognized he does not form the least notion. That brahmana[2] who does not grasp at a view, with what could he be identified in the world?
"They do not speculate nor pursue (any notion); doctrines are not accepted by them. A (true) brahmana is beyond, does not fall back on views." |
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Sun Oct 23, 2005 11:04 am Post subject: the phrase “non-apprehension of non-things” |
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Plamen: concerning the phrase “non-apprehension of non-things” in verse 30.
Thank you for this clarification.
This reading is to be found in the essay of S.K. Wertz, posted at the beginning of this thread by you (and without comment)! It is, reportedly, based on a translation by Frederick J. Streng.
I am not competent to judge between translations, having no Sanskrit skills. I am aware that variations routinely occur, due to different interpretations of the doctrinal context.
I respect your judgment and do not doubt the correctness of your reading. But please give me some explanation as to why you think Streng added the words “of non-things”. There must be some reason for this reading.
Looking at your explanation of Nagarjuna’s verse 30, I can suggest as his reason that “non-apprehension of non-things” refers to two successive acts of non-apprehension: first non-apprehension of an object about which something might be claimed, and second non-apprehension of any claim concerning such eventual object. That is to say: it tells us that we have cognized neither a subject nor a predicate with which to formulate some proposition.
In the proposed “non-apprehension of non-things” phrase, then, the complement “non-things” refers to not having cognized an object (a topic of discussion), and the verb “non-apprehension” refers to not having cognized something (to say) about such eventual object. Do you agree with this reading?
I will in any case modify my analysis of this phrase in the next edition of Ruminations, at least by stressing that this is based on at least one translation, which is contested by at least one other translator.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Sun Oct 23, 2005 11:09 am Post subject: the essay of S.K. Wertz |
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Regarding the essay of S.K. Wertz (posted at the beginning of this thread by Plamen). NOTE THE SYMBOLS WERTZ USES ARE NOT ALL PROPERLY REPRODUCED IN MY QUOTATIONS BELOW.
Wertz interprets Nagarjuna’s verse 29 as a single argument, which happens to be formally invalid at first reading:
| Quote: | In sentential logic (SL) the argument would be symbolized as follows:
P→E
-P
-E
Immediately we see a logical mistake here, so Nagarjuna is in error!
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Wertz does not accept such an outcome, preferring to think Nagarjuna has some other, more profound idea in mind:
| Quote: | | Such an interpretation would lead to attributing wholesale irrationalism to Nagarjuna — something that should be avoided. |
Wertz therefore proposes a new reading of the argument, in which the negations in the minor premise and conclusion of the above argument have a different sense than initially thought:
| Quote: | If we interpret "I do not make a proposition" not as the negation ("-") of P, but as a Fregean or illocutionary "act" or "negation" as B. K. Matilal does, which denies the uttering rather than the utterance. By E, "error," Nagarjuna means propositional error…
So the second premise is really not represented by -P but -├P where "├" is the Fregean symbol for "asserted that." Then what is -├P? "Not making a proposition P" would be not speaking P or silence with regard to P and not meaning a global linguistic silence….
Consequently, the argument form for verse 29 should be symbolized as:
P→E
-в”њP
-в”њE
….
Therefore the silence here is a dogmatic silence and an illocutionary act or negation (see Matilal, 234) which averts an argument…. we have moved from exclusively logical considerations into psychological ones….
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Concerning this theory of Wertz’s, I would like to make a couple of brief comments.
Firstly: if the goal in reinterpreting the original negations is to restore a valid argument, has that goal been achieved?
Does the major premise “P implies E” play any role in getting the conclusion “I do not make an error E” from the minor premise “I do not make a proposition P”? I would say the answer to that question is: No. We do not know have a formally validated argument, but two or three separate assertions. The major premise does not help us prove that the minor premise leads to the conclusion. It plays no apparent role.
To explain the place of “P implies E” in this segment of Nagarjuna’s discourse, i.e. what role it serves in convincing us of his position, we have to assume (as I have done in my second post, above), that verse 29 communicates two arguments (not just one). These arguments are enthymemes, i.e. partially tacit (as I described above).
This brings us to the second point. The validity or invalidity of any argument is not a function of its explicitness.
Logicians have always recognized that much of our reasoning consists of partly unstated premises and/or conclusions. That is why I tried stressing in my second post that “having a thesis” refers to any proposition: positive or negative, openly advocated or implicit in one’s discourse, spoken out loud or written, or merely thought in one’s head or merely wordlessly intended, admitted or unadmitted but just logically implied or condoned in one’s other beliefs.
Given the original apodosis is invalid (due to fallacy of denying the antecedent), it will not become any more valid if the minor premise and conclusion are essentially unspoken or unadmitted or unasserted. The invalidity of the argument, as far as I can see, remains. The major premise was useless before and remains useless now.
Rather, I would suggest to Wertz, Nagarjuna has here two formally valid arguments, as indicated in my second post. The proposition “P implies E” is a particular application of a broader thesis (of Nagarjuna’s) with the same thrust, and its role here is to confirm to us his virtuous concern with consistency. The propositions “not P, therefore not E” are part of an argument with the major premise “if no position is taken, no error is logically possible”, which is left tacit because it is obvious. It is indeed obvious, but it is also pretty inane! It certainly does not suffice to prove Nagarjuna’s overall thesis, although it is indended by him to seem to do so.
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Last edited by Avi Sion on Sun Oct 30, 2005 3:32 pm; edited 3 times in total |
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Avi Sion
Age: 59 Gender:
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| Posted: Sun Oct 23, 2005 11:13 am Post subject: Nagarjuna’s ultimate doctrinal intentions |
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As for Wertz’s views concerning Nagarjuna’s ultimate doctrinal intentions, I would again largely disagree (though I admit I am no expert in the matter). He writes:
| Quote: | Hence, Nagarjuna equates samsara (ordinary existence) with nirvana (enlightenment)….
The upshot of all this is that nirvana needs no interpretation. This is, I believe, Nagarjuna's point. |
But, it seems to me, Nagarjuna does not exactly consider samsara and nirvana as one and the same – but seems rather to consider his opponents’ “nirvana” to be a subset of samsara, so that his own “nirvana” is neither-nor either of them. He �one-ups’ his opponents, beating them at their own game.
I would also doubt the accuracy of Wertz’s claim that Nagarjuna is merely opposed to philosophical reflection, or �interpretation’ of facts – and effectively content to experience the �facts’ fed him by his senses and his fantasy. He writes:
| Quote: | Fact is the result of perception and interpretation is the result of inference, so the two pairs are in the same family of distinctions….
Nagarjuna used similar ideas to make the point that samsara consists of facts and involves no interpretation (a realist's claim) and that philosophy or theories about those facts or ordinary existence are interpretations (a positivist's claim). Nagarjuna wants to dispense with philosophy or interpretation and to be left with just the facts or "the work-a-day world" (verse 28 )….
What this experience reveals is non-things or emptiness, and that is no different than samsara or nirvana…. |
Rather, I would suggest (based only on my Buddhist Illogic study and random readings), Nagarjuna is opposed to all ordinary forms of cognition – physical perceptions, mental imaginations, verbal or just intended acts of the rational faculty. He believes it is necessary to sweep away in one fell swoop all aspects of our normal understanding, and leave the mind entirely free and virginal for the pure consciousness of enlightenment to shine through.
This is historically, too, the direction taken by some currents of Madhyamika Buddhism. In the Rinzai school of Zen Buddhism, the koan exercise is used precisely to help the disciple break away from common cognitive habits, and effect this release into true awareness. It may well work, for all I know.
I hasten to add that my critical attitude towards Nagarjuna is not directed towards the Buddhist goal of Enlightenment. It is a value I share. I am antipathetic only to his philosophical means, which are an unfair assault on human experience and reason. If his means were fair, i.e. if his assault were logically sound, I would subscribe to it. But there is so much sleight-of-hand involved, so many lies and manipulation, that I am invariably scandalized!
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