Indian Logic Forum

Plamen · Posted: Sun Nov 06, 2005 9:19 am Post subject: The Chariot Analogy Predicament

The analogy of Nagasena comes to show that there is no independently existent whole. What is real are only the parts, rather than the whole. The whole is only a name for denoting a particular aggregate of parts. The same with the Self. It is not something different from the pancaskandhakam, just a name for denoting the individual combination of the five aggregates. Not something different and above them. Or, as Buddha said in the Burden and the Bearer of the burden sutra, it is the bramhana (brahmin) that is the bearer of the burden. And when we start analyzing the brahmana, we see that each and every brahmana is a particular pancaskandhakam. Does the pancaskandhakam exist independently of the five skandhas? The answer of Buddha - we are said - was, no, it does not.

We can take the wheel of the chariot and see that it cannot exist independently of its spikes, etc. parts, take further the spike and see that it cannot exist independently of the wood threads, etc., take the wood thread and see that it cannot exist independently of its molecules, take the molecules and see that they cannot exist independently of their atoms, take the atom and see that it cannot exist independently of the dharmas that are the component parts of it. So, fundamentally, anything apart from the dharmas does not exist independently; anything we see in the world and in ourselves is just a name for denoting some particular conglomerate.

The big question now is, does the dharma exist by itself? If not, then neither the whole, nor the parts have independent existence. Which invalidates the argument of Nagasena holding that it is the parts that matter, not the whole. In fact, both parts and the whole do not matter.

In the Vajira Sutta, chariot is the analog of the living being (bhAva), which in other words is the pancaskandhakam (the subject of the five skandhas). Yet we have seen above that saying that there are parts rather than a whole only perpetuates the predicament without solving it. If we say that it is the five skandhas that are really there rahther than the pancaskandhakam (the word collectively denoting them as a whole and at the same time as a subject, because the whole is the subject of its parts - avayava-avayavi-bhava), than we shall see further that, say, rupa-skandha is only a name for denoting the particular rupa, sparsa, gandha, etc. dharmas. Should we take the rupa-dharma as the ultimate real, then we shall see again that it is only a name for, or a whole (subject) uniting 20 or 21 characteristics, like blue, yellow, red, etc. down to darkness (or sky). Should we further take the blue as a real, we shall again see that it is a general name for denoting light-blue, dark-blue, lazure, Turkish blue, etc.

So, we see that the very logic behind the chariot analogy is fundamentally flawed. It is wrong to say, there are parts rather than whole, because this leads to the above predicaments.

On the other hand, if, say, the rupa or any other particular dharma is not an ultimate part or element, then the foundational logic of the Abhidharma lists is also invalidated.

Or we have to substantially revisit our understanding of dharma.

Anyway, if there are any Abhidharma or Buddhist logicians left, I challenge them to defend the foundational logic of Buddhism.

Avi Sion · Posted: Fri Nov 18, 2005 9:39 am Post subject: whole-parts etc.

Plamen: just to feed the discussion, I enter it with the following comments.

Several issues are treated here:
1. The whole-parts issue: what comes first the whole or the parts?
2. The ultimate existence of dharmas.
3. The Self.

Some suggested answers:

1. This whole-parts issue should be approached epistemologically rather than ontologically. Sometimes we see the whole first, and later subdivide it into parts. Sometimes we see the parts first, and later aggregate them into a whole.
By вЂ?seeingвЂ™, I here mean the phenomenological fact that something has appeared (in whatever sense- modality вЂ“ sight, sound, etc.) before us, without prejudging the issues as to what that вЂ?somethingвЂ™ is (a reality or an illusion, and more specific characterizations) and who or what вЂ?usвЂ™ is (a self-subject-soul or whatever).
The mental acts of subdivision or aggregation have to also be focused on. These are two of the acts of reason вЂ“ conceptual acts, which therefore may on occasion be right or wrong.
Offhand examples of these two processes:
I look out and see a bottle of mineral water on my desk. First I see the bottle as a whole, then I may take note of details such as its blue color, the reflections on it, how much water is in it, the label pasted to it, etc. This is subdivision.
I see the various the objects on my desk and then formulate the whole that unites them вЂ“ вЂ?the objects on my deskвЂ™. This is aggregation.
Which of the two objects, parts or whole, is more real? Which of the two processes subdivision or aggregation is more correct? Answer: neither supersedes the other. In either case, what we have is appearance, followed by rational processing of this raw data. Whether such processing is correct or not, whether the objects are counted as real or not, is not an issue to be resolved prima facie, but one which is resolved at the end of the enterprise of inductive and deductive logical evaluation.
That is to say: they are logically hypotheses, which must be tested for internal consistency, consistency with all other hypotheses, and continuing consistency with ongoing experience (i.e. appearances).
There is no basis for the kind of sweeping generalization that the Indian philosophers propose in this context. Moreover, the discourse of these philosophers must be tested on itself: that is to say, if what they say is true, would they be able to say it at all? I would answer: No.

2. The ultimate existence of dharmas issue can be approached in the same way. To deny such existence is not only to say that appearances are unreal (i.e. mere illusions), but to say that they do not even appear. This is a self-contradictory statement вЂ“ not merely a verbal contradiction in terms, but a conceptual absurdity.
It is a claim that nothing exists whatsoever, whether in the mode of reality or in that of illusion, or even at the mere phenomenological level. If so, what are these philosophers discussing? Does their discussion itself exist in any sense whatsoever? Do they themselves exist in any sense whatsoever? To be consistent, the answer must be вЂ?noвЂ™.
This is with regard to deductive logic. With regard to inductive logic, furthermore, we might ask: what makes these philosophers so sure of their own analyses and syntheses? Have they already validated these thought processes of theirs? Where, when, how exactly? Have they actually gone to the infinity of subdivision they claim to know by mere extrapolation, i.e. by verbal-conceptual or visual-mental imagination? No вЂ“ they are merely spinning a fantasy, and claiming this as ultimate truth.
In the realm of metaphysics, as in every other domain of human interest, we must proceed carefully, and with respect for factual givens (the appearance of appearances, the law of identity) and with responsible logical supervision.

3. Concerning the self (or subject-agent or soul or spirit). I hate to be so unfashionable, but I must admit I remain unconvinced to date by the Buddhist denial of self. Briefly put, this reserve on my part is due to the paucity of their arguments.
Indian philosophy apparently developed the conventional wisdom that concrete appearances (dharmas) are all phenomenal, i.e. they are the various sense-modalities that we either apprehend through the senses or imagine in our minds (sights, sounds, smells, tastes, touch-feelings like hard-soft, hot-cold, etc., emotions like physical or eventually mental pleasures and pains of various sorts).
Given this premise, it was inevitable that some Indian philosophers, i.e. Buddhists, would infer that there is no self вЂ“ for it is indeed evident that if you look for such an entity by looking at the phenomenal events we just listed, you will never find the self (other than by considering it as a more or less arbitrary aggregate of some of these phenomena).
But it can easily be counter-argued the idea of soul is not based on such phenomena! All we have to do is admit that there are non-phenomenal concrete appearances. And this thesis is not a mere conceptual inventionвЂ¦
If you carefully introspect, you see that your judgments about your self вЂ“ i.e. about whether you are at this time awake or absent, whether your attitude is open or sceptical, whether you are making an effort of attention or not, etc. вЂ“ such judgment is not based on conceptual inferences from phenomenal data (i.e. sights, sounds, etc. in your mind or beyond it), but are directly experienced by you. An apt name of such experience would be self-intuition or apperception.
Now, this is not to deny that some of our self-knowledge is based on observation of perceptible phenomena going on in our (apparent) minds or bodies or beyond. But if such phenomenal data is all we had, we would be logically unable to draw any conclusions about our innermost, most private attitudes and actions. Such data is insufficient. There has to be a more direct kind of self-knowledge to draw on.
Granting this analysis, it follows that our idea of self is not (or not only) an aggregate of phenomenal dharmas, but relies heavily on direct self-experience, on non-phenomenal intuition of oneвЂ™s own cognitions, volitions and evaluations.
I leave, however, open the question as to whether one directly intuits oneвЂ™s self as a whole, or one has an idea of oneвЂ™s self (self-consciousness of the subject-agent) through aggregation of such non-phenomenal intuitions of particular cognitions, volitions and evaluations.
I am not sure we have to assume the totality known experientially. I am open to the idea that this does not occur in ordinary consciousness, but is a conceptual product. I speculate, based on hearsay evidence, that such direct self-consciousness of the whole self is perhaps an extraordinary experience to be identified with вЂ?spiritual realizationвЂ™.
In any case, what this means is that the idea of a self is by no means logically defeated as most Buddhist philosophers claim. Since an alternative hypothesis is conceivable and there is evidence and arguments still in its favour, the Buddhist thesis logically counts as a mere hypothesis, if not a mere speculation.
This regards epistemology вЂ“ i.e. how we arrive at the idea of a self. But regarding ontology, there is no doubt in mind that the notion is irreplaceable. I would like someday any one such Buddhist philosopher to explain to me exactly how an illusory mere-aggregate can have illusions. If the self does not exist, no consciousness (right or wrong) is at all possible; also, volition (the source of error and correction) is impossible.

I invite interested in further details on the above topics to visit my website www.thelogician.net.

Avi Sion · Posted: Tue Nov 22, 2005 11:33 am Post subject: whole-parts relation

I should perhaps specify here my own (not necessarily original) positive theory on these issues (detailed in my Phenomenology):

In my view, the whole of existence, i.e. all now or ever apparent existents, including those we class as matter, mind or spirit вЂ“ it is all One. This is the ultimate Reality, corresponding to the Buddhist вЂњoriginal groundвЂќ (and other similar ideas).

All apparent particular existents are indeed illusions, in the sense that a ripple or wave is related to a large body of water. The disturbance of water has no precise beginning or end вЂ“ we mentally project its individuation and abstraction from the water. вЂњWeвЂќ being also ourselves parts of the water (separated out of it in the same illusory way).

In this sense, one might contend that whole is ontologically prior to the apparent parts (though our knowledge tends to move from the parts to the whole). But also one can agree with the Buddhist ultimate equation of Nirvana and Samsara (two truths doctrine) that whole and parts are fundamentally one and the same.

Note that in this proposed view, the individual self has consciousness and will by virtue participating in the grand Self (G-d of theism or вЂњoriginal groundвЂќ of Buddhism). What is illusory about it (the little self) is not its very existence or spiritual substance, but the mere fact of its individuation.

Mary · Posted: Wed Nov 23, 2005 5:12 am Post subject: Hindu Dharma and Buddhist Self

Dear Avi,

My understanding of 'dharma' is that the term is used to indicate a 'process' rather than an 'object', and in itself is not inclusive of anything that could be termed 'concrete'. It seems that ancient Hindus were the first 'phenomenologists', questioning things and events 'sensed' and determining that what is 'sensed' is not the things or events in and of themselves. Dharama then indicates the entire process of receiving sensory data, interpreting that data, assigning some meaning to the data, and then assigning some 'label' to describe the meaning.

Dharma are then 'aggregated' into perceptions of things and events. Dharma are classifed by the different sensory apparatus of sensation and 'mental' combinations of apparati. These 'heaps' or 'piles' of data are the skandha.

So, it seems, Hindu logic proceeds from the 'parts' rather than the 'whole'. My understanding of Hindu logic is somewhat less than my understanding of Buddhist logic, which is to say 'miniscule'. But it seems that only by 'higher' thought processes (those that involve more than mere sensory input) are 'wholes' perceived.

Skandas, therefore, are dharma 'parts' that are aggregated by 'higher' thought processes into mere representations of 'wholes', which would seem to be the point of the 'Chariot Analogy'. But neither the parts nor the 'assembled' wholes can be 'proven' to represent the thing or event itself (the dharmin). Such 'ordinary' or 'mundane' processes of perception are always to be held suspect.

Thus, the 'mind' must acheive even higher processes that 'verify' the perception of 'wholes'. The is the objective of meditation and yoga, in my limited understanding. Thus, the 'ultimate' or 'supramundane' analysis of the assembly of 'wholes' is 'internally empirically' verified to be a 'veridical' representation of the 'whole'.

This frankly inductive process turns the ideas of 'particulars' and 'universals' upside down. Only 'particulars' can be verified through 'internal empiricism.' 'Universals' must always remain suspect, ordinary, mundane.

So, have they already validated these thought processes of theirs? Yes, via internal empricism. Where, when, how exactly? Through meditative, yogic, and tantric processing. Have they actually gone to the infinity of subdivision they claim to know by mere extrapolation, i.e. by verbal-conceptual or visual-mental imagination? No, because the claim is not in regards to the infinity of sub-division by mere extrapolation. Sub-divisions are extrapolated, but the 'supramundane' process of perception is the re-organization of these sub-divisions into internally empiric 'wholes'

Now, this still does not address whether they are merely spinning a fantasy, and claiming this as ultimate truth. But it would seem to give a different turn to how that processes can be logically analyzed.

Regards, M.Lee

Avi Sion · Posted: Thu Nov 24, 2005 1:25 pm Post subject: dharmas

Mary: thank you for these clarifications. I was of course aware from past readings that the term вЂњdharmaвЂќ has many senses, but I do not remember reading about the underlying suggestion of вЂњprocessвЂќ. But it makes sense.

Personally, the sense of вЂњdharmaвЂќ that I find most significant is that of вЂњraw data of experienceвЂќ, though to repeat I am aware the senses range all the way to вЂњDharmaвЂќ as Buddhist вЂњprincipleвЂќ.

Thus, I understand вЂњdharmaвЂќ as equivalent to the English term вЂњappearanceвЂќ in a phenomenological context. Although in everyday discourse, even interpretations are sometimes referred to as вЂњappearancesвЂќ, in phenomenological discourse, it is best to reserve the term to perceptual (sensory or mental) and intuitive data, allowing for eventual expansion to logical insights.

If one has special experiences as a result of some sort of deep mediation practice, such experiences (however unusual and hard to attain) still count as вЂњappearancesвЂќ FOR THE PERSON HAVING THEM (although for other people, they must be regarded as hearsay, i.e. as logically equivalent in status to a conceptual hypothesis).

Anything else is вЂ“ interpretation. Thus, when we subdivide our experiences or aggregate them, or when we formulate any theory concerning them вЂ“ none of that is experience per se, but only hypothetical interpretation to be tested repeatedly by experience through the logical principles of adduction.

It is important to be clear about this, so as not to be misled by alleged mystical authorities. When Buddhist or Hindu philosophers subdivide or otherwise organize the raw data of experience, they are subject like everyone else to logical constraints and tests.

I gather from what you wrote above that you agree on these strict principles. But many people do get carried away by fantasy when dealing with Oriental (or any other mystical) traditions.

Mary · Posted: Thu Nov 24, 2005 9:09 pm Post subject: Bases of Logic

Avi,

Especially in the West, dharma has come to be popularly interpreted as a body (or bodies) of teachings. The western phenomenological usage of 'appearence' is perhaps close to the actual meaning, but I think still misses the original a bit. I was not 'raised' to see the world from a phenomenological perspective. That was something learned at university. I try to imagine looking through eyes that have been trained since birth to see the universe as mere 'appearence'. I'm sure I fail miserably. But my understanding is better for the attempt, nonetheless.

I tend to look at things from a 'systems' persepective, thus, 'logic' to me is a system. Internal consistency of the system constitutes logic from this perspective. What is 'logical' in the consistency of one system may be 'mystical' in another. If one is developing a 'meta' logic, it must be internally consistent in examining the internal consistency of any specific logic. With that I agree. I think there may be many different such meta-logic systems that could be developed.

What little expertise I have comes from examination of 'science' and 'technology', rather than religion. (Of course, there are those who have likened sience and even technology to 'religion'.) In that context, it can be useful to make a distinction between 'facts' and 'truth.' Facts are those things and events that can be analyzed and 'tested' through 'sensory data.' Truths are those things and events that can only be analyzed through some intenally consistent mental process that may take into account 'raw sense data', but are ultimately interpreted through mental processing of those data. Sometimes, facts and truths coincide. Sometimes, they do not.

If they do not coincide, does that make truths 'mystical'? By definition, perhaps so. Thus, even 'scientific' 'theories' and 'hypotheses' have a 'mystical' quality.

I am a bit reluctant, I suppose, to agree that 'truths' must be "tested repeatedly by experience through the logical principles of adduction" since contents of such principles can vary. My thinking falls on the side that 'truths' may be, necessarily, 'individual' in nature. One may compare 'truths' and arrive at a conclusion that one or more other 'individual' truths may be close to one's own 'truths', and one may speak of those as being 'shared' truths. Much in the manner that German phenomenologists talk about 'Weltanshauung'.

Facts can be compared in a relatively straightforward manner of 'objective empricism'. I am less convinced about the means by which 'truths' can be compared. I hope this clarifies. We may be saying the same thing, in different ways, in this case attempting to express similar 'truths'.

Regards, M.Lee

Plamen · Posted: Fri Nov 25, 2005 9:22 pm Post subject: Re: dharmas

Avi Sion · Posted: Tue Nov 29, 2005 1:03 pm Post subject: phenomenological outlook

Mary: thanks for further comments.

Note that вЂњappearanceвЂќ also connotes process вЂ“ the coming (apparition) and going (disappearance) of experiences вЂ“ i.e. their impermanence. But I am sure that some strands of the word вЂњdharmaвЂќ are not reproduced in this word, as you say.

With regard to having a phenomenological outlook from birth вЂ“ that is a very interesting thought! I cannot claim to have had it, either. (I do, however, clearly remember when I had my own realization of this viewpoint. It was late December 1970 or early January 1971 in a Montreal flat. I had been reading Descartes, and realized that the concept of вЂњappearanceвЂќ is the neutral common ground between the concepts of вЂњrealityвЂќ and вЂњillusionвЂќ.)

Clearly, all of us are at birth naГЇve realists, and this philosophical realization of phenomenology requires some hard work. Kant got it from Hume, I from Descartes, someone else from Buddha. That does not mean we got вЂњenlightenedвЂќ, by the way.

The idea of вЂњsystemsвЂќ that you mention is of course a very intellectual construct, and a latecomer in the history of human thought. I doubt you were born with this engineering outlook, but no doubt acquired it through higher education.

But your question remains pertinent вЂ“ can we imagine a society that would educate their children from the start to view the world phenomenologically? Do children in Buddhist societies, for instance, exhibit less naГЇve realism in their everyday practice than Western kids? A good question, worth investigating, keeping in mind spiritual beliefs can be as naГЇve realist as materialist beliefs.

Actually, your question, combined with the following quotation of Nagarjuna given by Tendai Bay in the thread on theism, has given me an insight.

Avi Sion · Posted: Tue Nov 29, 2005 1:05 pm Post subject: dharmas

Plamen: I essentially agree with what you say in your last post.

Notably, that вЂњdharmaвЂќ includes (judging by say so, for I cannot say first-hand) even the Samadhi experience, for all its experiential distinctiveness and all-inclusiveness. I also agree that we use the mereological reduction, as you say it:

Plamen · Posted: Tue Nov 29, 2005 9:32 pm Post subject:

I would like to draw your attention to another quite interesting peculiarity of the Indian theory of parts and whole. It was a kind of cultural shock when, as a young student of Indian philosophy, I came to know that it was the whole that is the bearer of the parts, and that the parts consequently were not the bearer of the whole. We are accustomed to think - or maybe the people in my particular cuture are - that the bricks are the substantial support of the house. The Indian logic however would take the house as the substantial bearer of the bricks in the context of their particular relations. The whole situation is connoted to as the avayava-avayvi-bhava, where avaya is the part, avayavin is the whole considered to be the subject (Atman?) of the parts, and bhava is the relation between them. To me it sounded then as a perfect match to what could be called an organic theory of the whole.

Yet another reason for the Buddhists to deny any reality to the whole, which treat comes in perfect congruence with their anatma-vada.