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Avi Sion
Age: 60 Gender: 
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Joined: 30 Sep 2005
Posts: 69
Location: Geneva, Switzerland
488.23 points
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 Posted: Thu Nov 24, 2005 1:22 pm Post subject: volition |
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to Tendai Boy
Concerning the various arguments of Zyporyn’s you present. Ziporyn writes:
| Quote: | | Hence X cannot be omnipresent and eternal. Otherwise it would be indeterminate, and hence non-existent. |
This is incorrect. Something omnipresent and eternal (like G-d) would indeed be indistinguishable from any background, meaning that we would be unable to define it by differentiation from such absence of it. But such inability to define does not imply non-existence. For example, the term “existence” is indefinable, because everything that exists exists – but that does not imply existence to be non-existent! We can similarly imagine that G-d exists, even though we conceive him as omnipresent and eternal (and many other things). Such conception and theorizing is based on a variety of thought processes, such as extrapolation, use of symbols, etc.
Further on, he writes:
| Quote: | | But for two entities to have any kind of relationship, they must both exist. |
This is a misleading statement, which works because “entities” is used instead of “terms”. We are well able to conceive of relationships between non-existents (i.e. terms that have been proven without referents or whose referents are not yet established), as indeed Ziporyn himself does when discussing the status of things he does not believe in.
Ziporyn, again:
| Quote: | | If we imagine a ground of X’s existence, which coexists with X and sustains it in being, we must ask why X arose at some particular time after the ground was already in existence. |
Here his object is to deny the possibility of volition, by arguing that since the alleged will does not invariably accompany the alleged agent, the agent cannot be regarded as more than a condition, i.e. he is not the sole generator of the arising of X. This argument just underlines Ziporyn’s inability to transcend the easier “causation” scenario of causality; it is not a forceful argument against the more difficult “volition” variant.
He goes on:
| Quote: | | Moreover, even in the case of conditioning the state of a pre-existent thing, we must ask if this “state” exists or not…. X as such is “empty.” |
Here, his purpose is to deny existence to the agent of volition – i.e. the soul. Not only is a relation of volition between the soul and an act of will X impossible, in his view, but there is no soul anyway. Here again, this is just a foregone conclusion of his. It is not an argument, since we are free to hypothesize any entity we wish to, so long as we form a theory that complies with the laws of deductive and inductive logic.
Next Ziporyn raises the issue of continuity or discontinuity of objects across time:
| Quote: | | If the state of things at M continues to exist when M+1 arrives, however, time has failed to move ahead, or we must admit the coexistence of two alternate total states of being at the same time. If the appearance of M+1 does not necessitate the disappearance of M (which by our hypothesis possesses the power to bring about M+1), M would then continue to generate precisely M+1 repeatedly forever. |
Here, we must remember that out concept of time is not primary – it is not some sort of direct experience. We see (and otherwise sense and experience) motion – time is a concept we build on that basis. It is therefore our duty to adapt our concept to observed fact, and not posit some fixed, narrow concept of time and then wonder why fact does not quite fit into it.
Thus, we observe that at all �moments of time’ there is only one �state’ (or more precisely, state and motion’) of things – that M and M+1 do not coexist is an empirical given. Also given, is that M is not always identical with M+1, though they may in some respects have common aspects. Lastly, we can observe that M+1 is in turn succeeded by M+2 – it does not remain forever.
Now, how these observations are interpreted by us is another issue. Where the past disappears and where the future is while waiting to appear are certainly interesting questions, but my inability to answer them fully does not invalidate my knowledge. I let Einstein (or his successors) speak on the most appropriate concept of time in today’s context of knowledge.
But Ziporyn’s argument here is not really about continuity. He is just repeating his attempt to disqualify volition, by claiming that the coexistence of agent and will implies coexistence of past and present, or alternatively that such coexistence implies that the will (effect) would necessarily be always the same and repeated since the agent (cause) is the same. That is again the operation of his foregone conclusion, i.e. his intellectual fixation on causation as the only conceivable model of causality.
Next, you bring up Nagarjuna’s arguments:
| Quote: | | To exist is putatively to be a thing which is just itself and nothing else; to do this it must have (at least) one "mark" or characteristic that distinguishes it, which is unshared by anything else. Is the distinguishing mark the same or different from the thing it is the mark of? If the same, then no marked thing is distinguished--just a mark has arisen, not a marked thing, and hence no existence. If the mark is different from the marked thing, it is not this thing's own mark, but another thing; we have two existent entities, a marked thing and a mark… etc. etc. |
I discuss this argument in my BUDDHIST ILLOGIC, chapter 4. The key error here is to rely on the principle “a thing must have a mark to exist”. This is an error, because it turns knowledge upside down or inside out.
Our knowledge does not start with things, but starts with phenomena – “marks” in this context. The phenomenon appears before me, i.e. I am aware of something distinct. I may call this appearance a “mark” or a “thing” – but as of the moment it has appeared before me, one thing I am sure of is that it exists – at least as a phenomenon, i.e. phenomenologically (whether it is real or illusion, matter or mind or spirit, etc. – these are later issues, to be dealt with conceptually). Using the countless appearances that appear before me, I gradually build up in my mind some concept of the world I face. (See my Phenomenology.)
Nagarjuna exploits people’s ignorance, giving the impression that the raw material is the product, and thus creating seeming division between “thing”, “mark” and “existence”. It is dishonest.
You then argue, using the same kind of rhetoric:
| Quote: | | "what specific characteristics of non-X account for the arisal of X," and then "what is the relation between these specific X-causing characteristics and non-Xness? Are these characteristics the same as non-X or different?" |
The answer to that question is very simple: the putative characteristics within non-X are also non-X. The cause of X, by the way, is never defined as non-X – it is incidentally non-X. If what you imagine at first as the cause turns out not to be so, but it turns out instead that constituent of what you first thought of as the cause is the more precise cause, so well and good – but the latter is still a non-X. (PS say “arising” not “arisal”)
You go on:
| Quote: | | as Ziporyn says, how can non-X be related to X without there being some contact between them? (Or between both and a third, neither-X-nor-non-X medium)? But for contact an interface is required, and then we have to ask if the interface is part of X, part of non-X or part of both? If either of the first two, there is no interface. If the third (part of both), we have X and non-X overlapping, which means they cannot really be mutually exclusive, which they had to be by definition, and for any causation by an "other" to have occurred |
Here again, he is using Nagarjuna rhetoric, contrary to the �laws of thought’. In logic, X and non-X do not overlap at all (there is no �X and non-X’ – no contradiction), and there is nothing between them (there is no �neither X nor non-X’ – no middle), period. There are no ifs or buts about it. The �interface’ of contradictories may be imagined as a line devoid of thickness, they may well exist side by side in spatial or temporal succession and contiguity. There is no problem with that normal view.
Finally you write:
| Quote: | | I'm not sure why you think volition is excepted from the general requirements of causality, if the latter is construed in its broadest sense as indicated here (dependence for existence on the presence of some other entity): isn't a volition "caused" at least in this sense by the agent of causation? |
The answer to this question is yes: the will is dependent on the agent of it, and volition is therefore not exempt from the “general requirement of causality” you postulate. I quote my VOLITION AND ALLIED CAUSAL CONCEPTS, chapter 3.1 on this issue:
| Quote: | As earlier suggested (chapter 2.1), volition – unlike causation – cannot entirely be defined by means of hypothetical (if–then) propositions. However, we can partially delimit volition that way, as follows.
First, we focus on volition as the presumed �causal’ relation between an agent (soul) and certain events in or around him (called events of will), whatever be the exact form of that relation. That relation may intuitively be assumed to be other than causation, though some causation may be involved in it. A general causative statement “without an agent, there would be no volition” can be invoked to show partial involvement of causation.
Second, we point out that without that particular agent, those particular events would not – indeed could not – occur; they are reserved for that soul, it is irreplaceable in their genesis. This may be expressed as a conditional proposition: “if not this particular soul, then not those particular events”. The latter just means that the agent concerned (as an individual, and not just as an instance of a kind) is a sine qua non of the particular events (presumed �of will’) under scrutiny.
However, while the soul is thus a necessary causative of the events, it does not causatively necessitate them, i.e. it is not a complete causative of them. For it is clear that, in what we call volition, the soul is not invariably followed by those events (the presumed events of will), but remains at all times – till they do occur – also compatible with their negations. That is to say, with regard to causation, the compound conditional proposition “if this soul, not-then these events and not-then their negations” is true.
[Footnote: The “if–not-then” form of hypothetical, I remind the reader, is the exact contradictory of the “if–then” form. It simply means that the consequent “does not follow” the antecedent.]
However – and therein lies the mystery of volition – we intuit that the agent alone does somehow �make necessary’ or �completely cause’ the events concerned when they do occur. At that time, the proposition “if this soul, then these events” becomes effectively true, although such a change of �natural law’ is not possible under the relation called causation. Therefore, some other category of causality must be involved in such cases, which we call volition.
That is about as far as we can get into a definition by means of ordinary conditional propositions. We can delimit the concept of volition to a large extent, and clearly distinguish it from causation, but that is still not enough to fully specify its formal structure. We can, however, go further by other means, step by step, as we shall see by and by. |
Needless to say, I recommend you read this innovative work if you have the patience. See in particular chapter 2.4 “Conceiving Divine Volition”, with regard to anti-theism.
_________________
Avi Sion, Ph.D.
www.thelogician.net |
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Plamen
Age: 54 Gender:
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| Posted: Fri Nov 25, 2005 9:46 pm Post subject: |
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| Quote: | | We are well able to conceive of relationships between non-existents |
Just wondering what is the relationship between the hare's horns and the turtoise fur?  |
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Tendai Boy
Age: 44
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| Posted: Sun Nov 27, 2005 3:21 pm Post subject: |
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Hi Avi:
Thanks for the detailed response. I think to respond to some of your points I perhaps need to make some remarks about Ziporyn's general reworking of ontology, which does not stop at Nagarjuna, but folows the Tiantai school. The conception of being there, which concurs with Nagarjuna but suggests an alternative, is more or less this: to exist in any form--this applies to abstract and concrete entities, to anything perceivable or conceivable--is to be a "coherence." That means to be a coming-together (a cohering) of at least two qualitatively distinct (i.e., discernible) "other" entities, and also to be coherent in the sense of itself "readable," i.e., distinguishable *from* other such entities. In fact, this "contrast to another" is itself one possible form of the "coming together" constitutive of the entity. The identity of the coherence is dependent on its elements, its contrasting contrasts and its precedents and antecedents. But the horizons of relevance of contexts is always indeterminable (this is where the Buddhist "Emptiness" comes in), since context is constitutive of content. In that case, Ziporyn concludes, to be is to be a coherence, and to be a coherence is always to be a merely *local* coherence (that is, it's readable as thus and so only within a certain arbitrarily fixed local context). But to be a local coherence means to be a global incoherence (when other contexts are allowed to exert their relevance, the original identity is effaced, or overlaid with conflicting identities). Hence: coherence is incoherence, or to be and not to be are identical. There's a next step: it means not a blank "not-being" which excludes all beings (that would be a "being" acc. to Ziporyn: he defines an “entity” as “whatever definitively excludes any other entity” (Hegel, right?) so definitive blankness would count if excluded any contents) but the "intersubsumption" of all possible coherences! To be is to be a oneness, but to be a oneness is to be a twoness (at least). Ziporyn thus asserts that what he calls “moretoitivity”—heterogeneity, so that there is always more to discover--is constitutive of being. He also describes this as built-in “asness”: to be “this” is always to be “that” appearing “as” this. There is no “this” simpliciter. This means there are not just two truths, as in N., but three: local coherence, global incoherence, and the Center, or Intersubsumption of local coherences. It also means that "conventional truth" covers all possible statements: every putative existent is locally coherent (and this includes God, this table, myself, existence) but globally incoherent.
So in response to your remark about "existence," I think Z would say that a term like "existence" is locally coherent but globally incoherent. It makes sense until we think it through to the end. That this applies also to any other, apprently finite, entity, is a larger point which I'm not prepared to explain here; but I'll try in a future post. But we are able to speak about these things because they are locally coherent, and this does not obstruct our claim that they are also globally incoherent. Existence does not exist, absolutely speaking. It is meaningless because omnipresent. It seems to have meaning because we are implicitly contrasting it with "something else": nonexistence. Thinking it through, though, we have the problem of whether nonexistence "exists": if so, our original contrast collapses. If not, there is still nothing to contrast existence to, and hence it still cannot exist!
The same point applies to your remark about relations between non-existents, and why Z is willing to talk about them: the are local coherences too.
As for the point about the thing and its mark: I believe what Nagarjuna wants is precisely an acceptance of the phenomenological experience, but without the unjustified metaphysical conclusions that tend to skew our experience: substance, being, God, etc. The claim that "God exists" or even "causality exists" is more than a phenomenological description: it makes an assertion about what is really so. The "thing and its mark" idea is a way of spelling out what "really so" is meant to indicate here. God must not only "appear" but actually "exist" to satisfy the theist, no? This "exist" implies the thing/mark structure.
A more basic point is at stake here, though. All Buddhism rests on the assumption that there is something profoundly skewed about our ordinary perception of reality, saturated with mistaken metaphysical assumptions. Your argument about volition--and I confess that I have only read your self-quotation here, not the entire work, although I would like to do so--seems be saying: "All known forms of causation disallow one-cause being completely responsible for any effect: but our experience of volition doesn't FEEL like that; instead we say and believe that it is the sole cause. Therefore we establish a new word for it and call it a whole different kind of causation." Is that not essentially what you're saying here? The whole Buddhist point is that this ordinary way of experiencing and describing volition is itself mistaken.
We perceive the world as flat, we are mistaken about this, even though knowing that we are mistaken about it doesn't make the appearance go away. The idea that volition is a metaphysically distinct form of causation is a similar illusion. The way we discover illusions is by trying to find alternate explanations which will account also for the appearance, applying Occam's razor. Hence, we can explain why the earth appears flat to us, in a way that is consistent with our explanation of why it cannot be flat. Similarly here, we can explain why volition appears exceptional to us in a way that is consistent with our understanding that it is not, that it is part of the same system of causal rules that apply elsewhere. This doesn't have to land us in a Spinozistic determinism, which is one of the great attractions of Ziporyn's book, and the coherence ontology outlined above. But it does mean we can't just appeal to some "mystery of volition" to justify inventing new metaphysical categories. Isn't that just another word for ignorance?
As to the interface quesiton, again you appeal to a common-sense conception; the point here is that this is only locally coherent, and falls apart open closer scrutiny. Does the interface exist? Then it must have some "thickness." In that case we have the same question again: the "edges" of this existing interface are where the real interfaces lie. Do they exist? Both "yes" and "no" fail to make sense (are globally incoherent). Zeno's paradox, no? |
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Avi Sion
Age: 60 Gender:
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| Posted: Tue Nov 29, 2005 12:50 pm Post subject: empty classes |
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Plamen:
Quoting me "We are well able to conceive of relationships between non-existents”, you ask:
| Quote: | | Just wondering what is the relationship between the hare's horns and the turtoise fur? |
The answer to your question is already in it!
How are we able to speak of “a hare’s horns” or “a tortoise’s fur”? Quite simply: using our imagination to bring together experiential items in novel ways. This is especially evident in concrete examples like those you have given.
Thus, you have in the past seen a hare (without horns), or a picture of one, and horns on bulls or goats, or illustrations thereof; then, drawing images of these from your memory, you construct a combined image of a hare with horns.
What is the logical status of this visual invention? It is, to begin with, a mere hypothetical entity, a fiction. Next, we must compare it to the whole of our knowledge base, and consider whether in this present context it is still “conceivable” – i.e. does it contradict laws of logic or believed laws of nature we believe in, in any way? Next, we test it against (new) experience. Are there any horny hare to be found? Not so far. Are they at least potential, or is there some law of biology which makes such a combo impossible? Biologists would make experiments and pronounce their judgments. Perhaps future evolution will produce such animals, or maybe an artificial selection program, or some genetic manipulation.
Similarly for furry tortoises, and all other imaginary entities. This is the way we work, not only if we are science-fiction novelists, but also if we are serious scientists. Having seen balls of all sorts (pellets, cannon balls, footballs, etc.), Dalton thought of atoms as tiny balls, by analogy – i.e. he imagined a common ball, but on a much, much smaller scale.
Now, “what is the relationship between the hare's horns and the tortoise fur?” Well, I could for instance bring the two imaginary terms into a larger compound – e.g. I could imagine a beast with a horny hare’s head and a furry tortoise’s body – with no other intent than to write a children’s story.
Or, I could classify these two null classes together under the larger null class “non-existents”. Or again, I could philosophically discuss the common genesis of these empty terms, as just done above.
There are thus many ways “non-existents” can enter quite legitimately into our discourse. Indeed, our discourse is an ongoing juggling of terms, moving them gradually from the category of “existents” to that of “non-existents”, or vice-versa. For, little in our knowledge is given once and for all, and with absolute clarity, but our knowledge is constantly “under construction”, moving from relative vagueness to greater clarity, from relative uncertainty to greater clarity, and vice versa.
_________________
Avi Sion, Ph.D.
www.thelogician.net |
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Avi Sion
Age: 60 Gender:
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Location: Geneva, Switzerland
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| Posted: Tue Nov 29, 2005 12:52 pm Post subject: Ziporyn's claims |
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Tendai Boy:
I could reply to your presentation of Ziporyn sentence by sentence, and show the amazing incoherence and absurdity of his thought. But frankly, I do not have the patience to write still more about such nonsense. I will just make a couple of general comments, and let you think and judge for yourself:
1. TEST ANY THEORY ON ITSELF, is the first commandment of the logician. Many famous and revered philosophers fail this simple test.
Notice that Ziporyn is putting forward a definite theory of reality, that it has a certain meaning rather than a number of opposite or alternative meanings. Yet, this theory of reality is such as to deny reality to other theories, weaving a scenario that building a worldview with any precision is impossible. Therefore, he exempts himself from his own scrutiny and critique, and he is involved in self-contradiction. This means he is wrong.
2. ALWAYS BE CLEAR ABOUT THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PHENOMENOLOGICAL, EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL APPROACHES TO PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES, is another important commandment. When you see a philosopher freely mixing these intellectual approaches and issues, you can be sure he is going to get confused and confuse his readers.
Existence is a given – it is given in appearances, at least. Such appearances are not constructs, but the building blocks of all construction, which is something conceptual. “Coherence” and “incoherence” are concepts – they cannot affect our (previous) phenomenological experience of the world. Appearances are naturally “coherent”. It is only theories that may be judged “incoherent” – especially as when they end up proclaiming “or to be and not to be are identical”, i.e. when they result in breaches of the laws of thought.
3. BE AWARE OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN INDUCTION AND DEDUCTION. This refers to another common trap, related to the preceding confusion. Many philosophers fall into error by confusing the identity of things and our knowledge of them, and more broadly the inductive process and the world process.
Ziporyn’s discourse, as above rendered by you, is full of such confusions. Ask yourself: how does he know so well and so surely what he claims no one else can? His distinction between local and global is a valid one within inductive logic, with reference to context of knowledge. But it has nothing to do with reality as such, i.e. the ultimate object of knowledge.
Reality is what it is (or becomes) – whatever it happens to be (or become). It is only human knowledge that is in an uncertain or relative position. The foundation of human knowledge is experience of all sorts: this (together with certain logical insights) is what can properly be called a priori and axiomatic truth. How we interpret this ongoing, changing given is hypothesis, the realm of a posteriori and revisable truth.
For instance, you write:
| Quote: | | Existence does not exist, absolutely speaking. It is meaningless because omnipresent. It seems to have meaning because we are implicitly contrasting it with "something else": nonexistence. Thinking it through, though, we have the problem of whether nonexistence "exists": if so, our original contrast collapses. If not, there is still nothing to contrast existence to, and hence it still cannot exist! |
I agree that existence is omnipresent wherever it occurs – but that does not imply it does not exist! Moreover, it does not mean that non-existence exists. Both terms are in fact concepts, which we have constructed to help us categorize and file away two sorts of appearances. Those that remain consistent with all others and all logical considerations (classed as “existents”), and those that are found problematic or downright conflicting (classed as “non-existents”). The primary givens of experience are all “appearances”. The concept of “existents” is a wider one, including not only such experienced existents, but also by analogy merely deduced or induced existents (i.e. thought of by interpretation or extrapolation or generalization, etc.) The concepts of “reality” and “illusion” are subdivisions of the preceding, allowing us to distinguish between logically successful and unsuccessful ideas. The concept of “non-existence” is our garbage can for the latter ideas. (For all these issues see my PHENOMENOLOGY.)
You further write:
| Quote: | | I believe what Nagarjuna wants is precisely an acceptance of the phenomenological experience, but without the unjustified metaphysical conclusions that tend to skew our experience: substance, being, God, etc…. |
To say “unjustified” is to suggest one has specific, valid logical standards that have been breached. If ALL human conceptual knowledge is “unjustified”, then no such standards of judgment are possible, i.e. you cannot claim anything “unjustified”. Therefore, this view is self-inconsistent – i.e. wrong. But of course, Nagarjuna wants his own “justified” (how?) and everyone else’s “unjustified” (why?) – i.e. special treatment for himself. To approach knowledge phenomenologically does not mean giving up conceptual knowledge – that would be inconsistent with any philosophical discourse whatever, which is necessarily conceptual. Wake up!
| Quote: | | All Buddhism rests on the assumption that there is something profoundly skewed about our ordinary perception of reality, saturated with mistaken metaphysical assumptions. |
Here again, it is not logically possible to deny ALL “ordinary perception of reality”, for this is the very basis of the concepts you are using in doing so. Where else do you think the words and ideas you use come from? The fact we all know that MANY (or even maybe MOST) of our interpretations of ordinary perception are in error, does not allow you to infer that ALL are wrong. Why? because, though such generalization is in principle acceptable (by inductive logic), it ceases to be acceptable if the result is a self-contradiction, which is the case here.
Regarding VOLITION. You suppose me to be arguing: “"All known forms of causation disallow one-cause being completely responsible for any effect: but our experience of volition doesn't FEEL like that, etc.” I say: Yes and No.
If you go into the genesis of the concept of causation, you see that it is our way of organizing data of conjunction or non-conjunction of phenomena. When they occur together constantly to any extent, we call that causation (otherwise, not). But such constant togetherness is not perceived (since we are not omniscient), it is based on a generalization. Such generalization is valid, provided it adheres to inductive logic – i.e. provided no contrary experiences arise later, etc. However, such ad hoc generalizations cannot be used to justify a general generalization about causation as such, i.e. claiming that it is universal and that there is no alternative to causation anywhere.
Note this well. There’s mathematically bound to be pairs of phenomena that are in constant conjunction – so there is causation in some cases. But it does not follow that all phenomena must needs fall in that pattern – to assume so is a generalization, and therefore an inductive move, which may be abandoned (or rather, delimited) if some good reason arises to do so. For instance, Bohr considered the principle of uncertainty in quantum mechanics to be a good reason for assuming natural spontaneity.
If you read my Volition, you will see that there are many good inductive reasons for assuming freewill – it is not just a matter of “feeling”. However, a consistent and complete theory of volition cannot be posited without assuming that we have some direct awareness of our own individual volitions. For the issue is not just how to justify volition as such conceptually, but to explain how we know our individual acts of volition – and for this we need to acknowledge non-phenomenal experience.
Volition is not a metaphysical invention of mine – it is a common belief of most humanity with broad practical significance: legal responsibility, personal development, human relations, society, politics, etc. The onus of proof is rather on those who deny it, for our experience of life and common sense belies them. You accuse us of ignorance – but so far I have only heard self-contradictory and superficial arguments. Fool’s gold.
Tendai Boy – to put it frankly: I have given your posts attention at length, because I have assumed that you are some young person in search of truth, and I wanted to save you on time from the intellectual clutches of harmful pseudo-thinkers. I have made my bodhisattva effort – I will go no further. I rest my case – I cannot devote more time and energy to this. Every man must ultimately study and think for himself, and take responsibility for his own life. I have no desire to take over you mind. So, good luck and peace.
_________________
Avi Sion, Ph.D.
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Tendai Boy
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| Posted: Fri Dec 02, 2005 9:54 am Post subject: |
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Dear Avi:
Thank you for taking the time to respond at length--I appreciate it, and I thought we were having a fruitful and civil discussion; I'm sorry it has aggravated you to the point of invective and loss of patience. I will understand if you don't want to respond further. But I would like to say one or two things about this still:
First, I consider "existence" to be a concept. It is not given, it is socially constructed, and it has certain particular contours that pertain to a particular cultural, linguistic, metaphysical history. As a simple example, it is not found in the Chinese language, classical or modern; the peculiar features of our notion of "existence" perhaps have something to do with the peculiar features of Indo-European languages (conflation of existential and predicative usages of the verb "to be," for example). This involves us in thorny questions about the relation of thought to reality, and so forth, which you perhaps are alluded to in your "commandment" (?) about separating epistemological, metaphysical and phenomenological realms. But it seems to me that this separation itself is one of the main things called into question by the Ziporyn hypothesis, and therefore cannot be assumed in advance as a standard by which it is to be adjudicated.
My point is that "existence" is a predicate that we use in sentences, to describe certain things. It conforms to the rules that govern those sentences. I simply mean that, if it is a term that applies to all possible instances of experience, it is a meaningless term. Since it is a word, it will always be a "term," not identical to what it is intending to refer to. Whatever that is might be omnipresent, but I would claim that it is therefore no longer merely "existent" in the original sense of this WORD, which necessarily requires a contrast. Note that to be truly omnipresent in the strong sense I am intending here, it would have to apply also to non-factuals.
Causality, as I mentioned before, is in the Tiantai theory no limited only to "efficient cause": it includes also conceptual contrast, any dependence on otherness of any kind. I agree with you about the unjustifiability of generalizing MECHANICAL causality for all possible states; but the single-cause stipulation applies also to the broader sense of causality here. I believe that this form of causality--necessary relation to an other--is provable, perhaps even analytically derivable from the notion of "existence." To be meaningful as opposed to meaningless, a term must be contrast to something else. To be discernible as opposed to indistinct, a figure must have a contrasting background.
I have no problem admitting "non-phenomenal experience," but qua "experience" I believe it will still need to conform to this "contrast" rule to be experience: for something to be experienced, it must be contrasted to the state prior to its having been experienced. This implies an INTERNAL (necessary) externality, and this is where the fun begins, where one-cause causality becomes a priori impossible for both the phenomenal and the non-phenomenal.
I agree with you that the claim that "all ordinary perception of reality" is mistaken is unintelligible, by virtue of Davidsonian "principle of charity"-type considerations, given the ordinary ontology of substances with predicates and the excluded middle as a fact about the world, and the straight "true versus false" epistemological to which you perhaps subscribe. But this is again, for me, one of the attractive parts of Ziporyn's alternate ontology and epistemology: he claims local coherence for all discernible positions, which is not the same as simple "wrongness"--although it is equal to global incoherence. But global coherence is not the criterion of "rightness," for the simple reason that it is impossible. Local coherences are "upayas," conventional truths. This applies, by the way, also to Ziporyn's own theory, as he clearly states, which would be my response to your first objection here; it is testable by its own standards.
But this surely doesn't mean that the mass of humanity cannot be sorely mistaken about many things for long periods of history! For Z. this doesn't mean they are wrong--even when they say "God" and "free will"--these are also locally coherent upayas. But they can be opened up into a broader framework which includes and sublates them: As I said last time, the broader explanation of why the world appears flat, or why we must experience our volitions as single-caused, does not eliminate these appearances, in fact it further grounds them in reality--but as appearances (or local coherences). The fact that our concepts of legal responsibility and so on depend on this conception is surely no argument for its correctness--in fact, just the opposite! It provides the motive for the unwillingness to consider the facts dispassionately. That said, I do not think the denial of pure single-cause freewill implies an abandonment of ideas of personal development and responsibility; it just requires us to rethink and reconfigure them, perhaps more fruitfully. One might note that the Buddha felt that both the idea of a soul completely in control of its own volitions and the opposite view, total randomness of action, made spiritual development impossible; the first, in fact, makes it unnecessary!
I do not expect you to reply, but I felt honor bound to at least offer a response. I wish you well, and I appreciate your seriousness in discussing these matters. I have a feeling that at this point we might simply have to agree to disagree. |
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Plamen
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| Posted: Fri Dec 02, 2005 9:25 pm Post subject: Re: Ziporyn's claims |
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| Avi Sion wrote: | | If you go into the genesis of the concept of causation, you see that it is our way of organizing data of conjunction or non-conjunction of phenomena. When they occur together constantly to any extent, we call that causation (otherwise, not). |
Post hoc ergo propter hoc doesn't seem to be a reliable fundament for a truly philosophical concept of causation. On the other hand, the universe is never seen to be conjoined with the existence of God, and yet God is postulated to be the cause of the Universe in most creationist religions. For some strange reason, we are all convinced that if something exists it cannot but have a preceding cause. In this case, there is no witnessed conjunction of cause and effect. Instead, there is a - let's call it - causal implication working upon our mind with the strength of an apodictic necessity.
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Plamen
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| Posted: Mon Dec 05, 2005 1:53 pm Post subject: |
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Avi:
| Quote: | | “what is the relationship between the hare's horns and the tortoise fur?” Well, I could for instance bring the two imaginary terms into a larger compound – e.g. I could imagine a beast with a horny hare’s head and a furry tortoise’s body – with no other intent than to write a children’s story. |
I would consider this question in somewhat different terms. There is indeed no necessity for something to exist in order to become a relatum (anuyogi) or a counterrelatum (pratiyogi). We can say, for instance, the horny rabbit has no trunk. Here the non-existent horny rabbit is the anuyogi, while the existing in general but lacking in this particular locus trunk is the pratiyogi.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Wed Dec 07, 2005 10:20 am Post subject: |
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Tendai Boy:
thank you for your response, which I have read carefully. If I do not respond further, it is because we disagree so fundamentally that with you (or Ziporyn) I would have to (re)write whole books, to react to almost every word or sentence. I simply have not the time or patience to do that. I have already written my �replies’ to these views in systematic book form. You can read that if interested.
As I said earlier, I tend to avoid controversy. I am more into constructive research, joint study, teaching or learning. Generally, if I sense a basic disavowal of or indifference to reason (i.e. the laws of thought) in a person I am debating with, I do not waste my time further: I do not insist on converting other people to my views.
For example, I was involved a couple a years ago in a debate concerning Nagarjuna with a fellow codenamed “Namdrol” in the E-sangha website: the moment I realized his doctrinaire impermeability to rational argument, I bowed out. I don’t care if the other fellow considers this a victory.
I believe we must all in the long run pay for our views through appropriate consequences within our life. The karma principle, you might say. I believe in helping people, but not against their will. Not stuffing it down their throats – which is impossible anyway. And also, not to the extent of enslaving myself in a discussion that gives me no pleasure.
Therefore, I say to you again: good luck! No offense meant, and thank you for your civilized attitude. Of course, I am just a guest in this forum like you, and you remain free and welcome to continue debating the same issues with other participants. But I opt for silence.
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Avi Sion
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| Posted: Wed Dec 07, 2005 10:21 am Post subject: |
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Plamen:
Regarding your 2nd comment first:
| Quote: | | There is indeed no necessity for something to exist in order to become a relatum (anuyogi) or a counterrelatum (pratiyogi). |
I of course agree. This is no reason for rejection of terms about possibly non-existent things, simply because all of knowledge is ultimately built on them, our cognitive processes being a gradual evaluation of their content with reference to cumulative experience and reason.
Regarding your 1st comment:
| Quote: | | Post hoc ergo propter hoc doesn't seem to be a reliable fundament for a truly philosophical concept of causation. On the other hand, the universe is never seen to be conjoined with the existence of God, and yet God is postulated to be the cause of the Universe in most creationist religions. For some strange reason, we are all convinced that if something exists it cannot but have a preceding cause. In this case, there is no witnessed conjunction of cause and effect. Instead, there is a - let's call it - causal implication working upon our mind with the strength of an apodictic necessity. |
Post hoc is not the same as constant conjunction. Post hoc is a one-time (or partial) observation, and constant conjunction is a summary of all observations to date. And of course, constant conjunction must be understood as meaning constant and exclusive conjunction – i.e. it goes in both directions, and on both the positive and negative sides – to be truly general.
Furthermore, although causation may be telegraphically defined as constant conjunction, it does not follow that we know it through any universal knowledge. For our limited human minds, all knowledge of generalities (other than the contradictories of self-contradictions) is based on generalization or adduction. In generalization, we take off from terms directly based on particular observation. Whereas in adduction, we invent more remote terms (postulates) which may help us to explain particular observations, relying on empirical tests to decide whether these terms are useful and applicable or to be rejected.
Both these forms of induction are everywhere used in philosophy, in the special sciences and in everyday discourse. It is therefore methodologically unfair to forbid these very same cognitive methods from being used in relation to religious issues. There is no in principle reason why we should not posit the existence of G-d as a hypothesis which may explain this or that mysterious observation (e.g. the universe as a whole).
The difficulty with this theistic hypothesis is that it is ultimately unverifiable (one can always imagine there might be an alternative explanation for a miracle). On the other hand, the nice thing about it is that it is also ultimately unfalsifiable (whatever view of the world you posit, I can say: well, that’s the way G-d did it)! Theism is therefore speculative either way, and so therefore is atheism. That is why religions depend on faith.
I therefore agree with you that in the case of G-d and the universe we have not witnessed conjunction. But this does not exclude the possibility of other inductive methods to suppose causality. In any case, note, the causality conceived by most theists is not causation (constant conjunction) but a more complex causal relation we identify with (or assume by analogy to) our own experienced and assumed volitional powers. We might call this ad hoc conjunction. This is more difficult to establish directly by observation and generalization, but it can still be inductively postulated as a hypothesis to be tested with reference to its overall fitness within our ordinary knowledge.
Let me add that I agree with you that something may be conceived as existing without cause. I repeatedly stress this in my work, having found no logical necessity to generalize from existence of some causality, to need for causal explanation in all cases. Such spontaneity is assumed by some scientists for ultimate nature, in quantum mechanics and in big bang theory. They may be right or wrong – it is speculative, as far as I can see. Indeed, even theists, who posit G-d as volitional cause of the universe, must admit G-d himself as uncaused. So, “everything has a cause” cannot consistently be posited unless we place that theory in an infinite universe scenario (at least in the past tense). This is equally true within atheism or theism. Within the latter, it means an assumption that G-d himself preexisted the universe we know for all time – which is quite consistent with the religious monotheistic doctrine.
As regards your explanation of our causal judgments with reference to “causal implication working upon our mind with the strength of an apodictic necessity” – this is of course itself a causal explanation. Therefore, if it is intended to imply general rejection (by ridicule) of the concept of causality, it is logically inconsistent with itself and untenable. No, in my view, although one might debate the category or type of causality and the specific causes or effects involved, there is no utility in trying to deny causality as such in principle.
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