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Plamen

Age: 54 Gender:  Zodiac:  Joined: 30 Sep 2005 Posts: 159 Location: Sofia 784.58 points
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Posted: Wed Dec 07, 2005 5:17 pm Post subject: |
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A left hand is constantly conjoined by a right hand. Is that enough to declare the left hand a cause of the right hand?
What might me true of logic (vyapti as invariable concomitance) is not true of causality. Causation is only one of the types of invariable concomitance hence the latter cannot be taken to be the revealed nature of the former.
On the other hand, there are causes that are still to be discovered. So they are not present to our mind as invariably conjoined with the effect.
Many people think that the thunderbird is the cause of the storm. |
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Avi Sion

Age: 59 Gender:  Zodiac:  Joined: 30 Sep 2005 Posts: 69 Location: Geneva, Switzerland 488.23 points
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Posted: Sun Dec 11, 2005 6:12 pm Post subject: causation |
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Plamen: I am surprised by your following comment; I would have thought you had more respect for the intelligence of Western man than that!
| Quote: | | A left hand is constantly conjoined by a right hand. Is that enough to declare the left hand a cause of the right hand? |
No Western philosopher would propose something so silly. First, because the left and right hand are not constantly conjoined: each can exist without the other, and indeed some men have had both cut off and lived. Second, because even if they were invariably together, they might be so due to being effects of a common cause, rather than being in a mutual cause-effect relation.
The expression “constant conjunction” is just a short-hand title for A is always with B and notA is always with notB, i.e. it applies not only to conjunction on the positive side of A, B – but also on their negative sides. I invite you to read my comments on this topic for instance in my RUMINATIONS, part I, chapter 8, section 6, so I do not have to repeat myself here.
This paradigm of causation is (I gather from different Western sources) well known to Buddhism. I mention it in my book BUDDHIST ILLOGIC, chapter 7, in the following paragraph (footnotes not included):
| Quote: | A definition of causality traditionally cited in Buddhism [given in Cheng, p. 84] is:
“When this is, that is; this arising, that arises;
when this is not, that is not; this ceasing, that ceases.”
It is an excellent definition of causation, or more precisely the strongest type of causation – namely complete and necessary causation.
It is better than the definition “constant conjunction”, proposed by some Western philosophers, which [apparently] only refers to complete causation [and positive events]. But the said traditional formula is not accurate. First because there are other, weaker types of causation, namely, complete but contingent, partial though necessary, and neither complete nor necessary – and derivatives of these. And second, because causation does not include volition. In truth, if we study the actual descriptions of “co-dependency” in Buddhist texts, it is easy to see that the causal relations referred to do not all fall under the stated definition of causality (as “when this is, that is”, etc.) but range far more widely over the many other senses of the term. |
Complete and necessary causation is what has earlier in this thread been referred to as “single causation” – which is a misnomer.
Regarding your statement:
| Quote: | | What might me true of logic (vyapti as invariable concomitance) is not true of causality. Causation is only one of the types of invariable concomitance hence the latter cannot be taken to be the revealed nature of the former. |
I invite you to look into my THE LOGIC OF CAUSATION sometime, and check out whether all conceivable modes, types, categories, degrees and situations of causation have been exhaustively considered in it or not.
Another of your statements I would like to highlight is:
| Quote: | | On the other hand, there are causes that are still to be discovered. So they are not present to our mind as invariably conjoined with the effect. |
Here, you (or the Indian philosophers you defend here) are to my mind confusing epistemological and ontological issues.
Defining causation as, say, in the above Buddhist version – that is giving the ontological schema. This is the ideal form we seek to fit our data into; i.e. if it seems to fit in the present context of knowledge, then we may fairly assume causation.
However, we remain aware that more data gathering may yield a different overall picture – i.e. we may discover the putative cause and effect are not as invariably conjoined as they seemed prima facie, or that their absences are not. The latter consideration is the epistemological one – an acknowledgement that our knowledge is not fixed/static but variable/dynamic; it is based on induction, not only on deduction.
The definition sets the standard; but our practice is one of repeated adaptation to ongoing empirical unfolding (through observation or experiment). _________________ Avi Sion, Ph.D.
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Plamen

Age: 54 Gender:  Zodiac:  Joined: 30 Sep 2005 Posts: 159 Location: Sofia 784.58 points
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Posted: Fri Dec 16, 2005 5:39 pm Post subject: |
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Avi:
| Quote: | | The expression “constant conjunction” is just a short-hand title for A is always with B and notA is always with notB |
Which means that A must be with B even after B has been produced. Or you put different meaning into "always".
Further, the fact that one may have only one arm is called exception to the rule. So a man has by definition to have two arms. Or two legs. That's why man is biped rather than quadroped or octoped. This is what the definition requires from a man. The two arms are constantly conjoined by definition, and yet are not the cause of each other. Which invalidates the definition of causality as "constant conjunction".
There are many other cons, because of which I cannot accept it as a valid essential definition. It is too broad and because of that defective. As defective as the post hoc ergo propter hoc which is a kind of temporal invariable concomitance aspiring to sunstitute the notion of causation. The same with cum hoc ergo propter hoc. _________________ Plamen Gradinarov, Ph.D., D.Litt.
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Avi Sion

Age: 59 Gender:  Zodiac:  Joined: 30 Sep 2005 Posts: 69 Location: Geneva, Switzerland 488.23 points
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Posted: Sun Dec 18, 2005 7:28 pm Post subject: causation |
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Plamen:
| Quote: | | Which means that A must be with B even after B has been produced. |
No – “always” here means the same as “constantly” – i.e. either simultaneously (as happens in some cases) or in sequence (ditto). That is, cum hoc or post hoc, repeating in all known cases (and not just a few).
Plamen:
| Quote: | | Further, the fact that one may have only one arm is called exception to the rule. So a man has by definition to have two arms. Or two legs. That's why man is biped rather than quadroped or octoped. This is what the definition requires from a man. The two arms are constantly conjoined by definition, and yet are not the cause of each other. Which invalidates the definition of causality as "constant conjunction". |
Incorrect. Man is not defined a priori – he is empirically discovered, then the data used to develop a fitting definition a posteriori. Definition is not always based on a universal, necessary characteristic – but may be based on a usual one, to start with at least. In fact, we are now way past any definition of man as biped or two-armed – precisely because these characteristics are not universal and necessary. A man may lose one or both arms or be born without. Exceptionally, here, would mean unusually. There is no pre-ordained rule that is being broken, implying a breach of causation. If you want to consider the causal relation of man’s two-arms, it would be accurate to call them effects of a common cause – the cause they have in common being (as we now know) a certain genetic makeup.
Plamen:
| Quote: | | There are many other cons, because of which I cannot accept it as a valid essential definition. It is too broad and because of that defective. |
As earlier mentioned, the definition of causation here discussed is a paradigm. There are many weaker forms of causation than this one, and many variations on the same themes (causation has many modes, being related to modality).
I see no use engaging in disputes about it: honestly, you have much to learn in this field (which is not a criticism). Check out “The Logic of Causation” and “Volition etc”, based on a lifetime of study of this subject, and see for yourself.
Moreover, if this manner of thinking is as you suggest erroneous, how do you explain Western man’s enormous success in scientific and technological endeavors (compared to Eastern superstition).
Please forgive me for keeping silence henceforth, as I will be busy for some time. _________________ Avi Sion, Ph.D.
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Plamen

Age: 54 Gender:  Zodiac:  Joined: 30 Sep 2005 Posts: 159 Location: Sofia 784.58 points
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Posted: Mon Dec 19, 2005 12:02 pm Post subject: |
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I doubt it very much that "constant conjunction" is the essential definition of causality in the West. Start with Aristotle to see that causality is a production relation, much the same as is karya-karana-bhava in Indian philosophy.
My point was and still is that correlation (including constant conjunction) does not imply causation. Moreover, this kind of reasoning is universally accepted as logical fallacy. _________________ Plamen Gradinarov, Ph.D., D.Litt.
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Mary
Age: 53 Gender:  Zodiac:  Joined: 02 Oct 2005 Posts: 36 Location: Texas, USa 114.45 points
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Posted: Mon Dec 19, 2005 3:27 pm Post subject: Causation |
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| Plamen wrote: |
My point was and still is that correlation (including constant conjunction) does not imply causation. Moreover, this kind of reasoning is universally accepted as logical fallacy. |
Here, I must agree with Plamen. One of the banes of causal analysis is detecting and including all the variables and parameters. Co-variance is not the same as 'cause'. One may have a system that perfectly describes co-variance, but in which no causal factor can indeed be found.
Regards,
Mary _________________ Kind regards,
Mary E. Lee, Ph.D. |
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